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The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships were designed to be relatively small surface vessels for 
operations near a littoral shore theater.  These ships were envisioned to be highly automated, 
networked, agile, stealthy surface combatants capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric 
threats in the littorals with minimum manpower.   To date, however, some of these ships have 
experienced significant engineering and propulsion plant failures that impacted mission 
accomplishment and were attributable, at least in part, to under staffing and over scheduling the 
human component of the automation-human operational environment.  The critical human 
components on the Littoral Combat Ship are bridge and engine room staffing.  Since the 
engineering plant has been the source of most major failures to date, this project sought to develop 
an engine room staffing and scheduling model for the Littoral Combat Ship class given a stated set 
of minimum mission objectives when operating under normal conditions – called “Condition III 
Underway Steaming”, which is used as the basis for official Navy manning calculations, and to 
provide recommendations for improved automation-human modeling.  A survey of the crew of 
several LCS ships was conducted and the results were analyzed using exploratory data analysis 
and multiple joint correspondence analysis.  Results of the survey analysis were applied to the 
design of a joint physical-cognitive-automation workflow analysis of critical procedures and 
failure modes as they map to four dimensions:  fatigue, watch and maintenance tasking, and 
iii 
 
automation-human interface.  Workflow analysis results were then simulated in an IMPRINT 
model of a typical watch period, and the results were evaluated against the four dimensions of the 
survey.  The project validated that the four dimensions analyzed are indeed worthy of consideration 
in manpower models, and that IMPRINT has the potential, with a few modifications, to model 
joint physical-cognitive-automation workflows as an improvement to the current manpower-only 
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1.1  TECHNICAL FORMULATION  
The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships were designed to be relatively small surface vessels for 
operations near a littoral shore theater.  These ships were envisioned to be highly automated, 
networked, agile, stealthy surface combatants capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric 
threats in the littorals with minimum manpower.  Most of the mission functions are performed by 
carried vehicles such as helicopters or unmanned vehicles such as the Spartan Scout, AN/WLD-1 
RMS Remote Mine hunting System and MQ-8B Fire Scout as part of the Navy’s goal to “unman 
the front lines.” To date, however, some of these ships have experienced significant failures in 
mission accomplishment which have been, at least in part, attributable to understaffing and 
overscheduling the human component of the automation-human operational environment.  In one 
case, an LCS had seawater leak into one of its main diesel propulsion systems and was forced to 
return to port for repairs. In another, an LCS ship suffered propulsion issues after engineers 
attempted to use gears without adequately oiling them. The subsequent damage cost $23 million 
to repair, according to the Navy (Gallagher, March 2014).  Based on these casualties, this project 
focused on what appears to be the critical human component of the Littoral Combat Ship: engine 
room staffing.  
The IMPRINT model is designed to start with a defined set of mission requirements as 
specified by the user and a set of attributes that could influence the ability of the platform (defined 
as the combination of the ship or “sea-frame”, the mission module, and the crew) to accomplish 




that all nodes are identified and adequately described.   As discussed above, engineering is 
common to all mission areas; in previous Naval Postgraduate School studies (Kerno 2015, 
Meredith 2016), this module is the most developed, listed as the most likely to be vulnerable to 
the impact of fatigue and overtasking, and based on this author’s experience, the most likely to be 
capable of being studied in real-life situations.  Previous IMPRINT projects have used the Forces 
Model function, which creates a more global force level manpower study, in which “workload” is 
just simple engagement with high level activities.  This study differs in that it looks at a detailed 
human performance scenario using Operations Model, where workload is defined as the mental 
capacity being utilized to perform more definitive tasks.  The detailed human performance models 
allow the analyst measure outcomes such as mission times, mission completion, and errors and 
their consequences as metrics. 
 
1.2  PROJECT PURPOSE  
 This project sought to develop a bridge and engine room staffing and scheduling model 
for the Littoral Combat Ship class given a stated set of minimum mission objectives when 
operating under normal conditions and varying littoral combat environments. Specific steps of 
this process:  
a. Identifying a stated set of mission objectives under normal and combat littoral 
environments.  
b. Decomposing the set of mission objectives into bridge and engine room functional 
performance requirements using IMPRINT and modeling tools.  
c. Performing root cause analysis of mission accomplishment failure modes in the littoral 




d. Identifying existing staffing and scheduling models and comparing their functional 
strengths and weaknesses to the engine room functional requirements.  
e. Selecting an existing or developing a new staffing and scheduling model that fits the 
engine room human-automation environment functional requirements.  
f. Testing and refining the proposed littoral combat ship engine room staffing and 
scheduling model in the IMPRINT virtual environment to verify attainment of the 
identified stated set of mission objectives.  
g. Documenting the model, making recommendations for validation of mission objectives 
accomplishment, and transferring to the Navy for use in normal and combat littoral 
environments.  
The project is designed to assist the Navy in developing a more accurate and precise model 
for manning the LCS by examining the impact of maintenance, operations, watch standing, and 
other design factors on the LCS ability to accomplish the mission.  In doing so, savings could be 
realized in the manning of the crew, which is one of the most expensive factors in ship design.  
Cost for this project was negligible, since much of the shipboard research was already funded and 
documented by Naval Postgraduate School students and was leveraged for this project.  Savings 
may take time to be realized and may be more in terms of “cost avoidance” than in actual monetary 
savings. Potential savings could be realized in avoiding future engineering failures through better 
modeling, which, based on previous failures, could be in excess of several million dollars and 
hundreds of lost operating days.  One could be the cost (once available) of the two past significant 
failures. Another potential benefit could be an improvement to the design of the ship’s bridge and 
engineering control station that result in better command and control and perhaps reduce the risk 




analysis of smaller crewed ships, it could be adopted by the Navy as a design model for future 
classes such as the new Frigate and the DDG-1000 class of ship, potentially saving significant 
time, cost, and effort in the design and manning of these vessels. If there is a desire to validate the 
results of this project using in-situ data collection and actual performance measures, cost estimates 
are provided Table 1 (rows with no cost have been deleted for space considerations).  
 
Item  Planned Expenditures  Remarks/ Clarifying Explanation  
Equipment  22,500  Motion loggers  
Contracts  45,000  NRC Postdoc  
Travel  8,000  1 visit to sponsor (3 people); 1 underway  
Labor    15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)  
FY16Qtr 1 Total      
       
Equipment  2,000  Equipment and batteries  
Labor    15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)  
FY16Qtr 2 Total      
       
Equipment  2,000  Equipment and batteries  
Labor    15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)  
FY16Qtr 3 Total      
       
Equipment  1,000  Equipment and batteries  
Travel  6,000  1 visit to sponsor (3 people)  
Labor    15 days (PI) 25 days (Research Assistant)  
FY16Qtr 4 Total      
       
Total Equipment  27,500    
Total Travel  14,000    
Total Labor  114,257.68  60 days (PI) 100 days (Research Assistant)  
Total Contract  45,000    
Total Overhead  0    
Grand Total  
$200,757.68    
 




1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT   
This project sought to address the problem: “What is the optimum manning and schedule 
for Littoral Combat Ship Class engine room personnel to minimize significant failures in mission 
accomplishment attributable to understaffing and over scheduling the human component in the 
automaton-human operational environment?” 
 
1.4  SYSTEMIC PROBLEM CONTEXT  
The foundational document for all Navy ships is called the Required Operational 
Capabilities (ROC) and Planned Operational Environment (POE) document (OPNAVINST 
3501.352A April 2014).  It is a very high-level document and does not provide a detailed task 
element list beyond the specific supporting elements for each mission area. For the focus areas 
pertaining to this study, a better set of tasks is found in the Engineering Operating Sequencing 
System (EOSS), which detail engineering operating procedures and casualty actions. There are 
several potential methods to decompose these actions into discrete tasks.  After considering each 
during the developmental phase of the project, the Hierarchal Task Analysis method was selected 
as being to most applicable to IMPRINT modeling, primarily since it has the most attributes that 
allow analysis of human-equipment interfaces.  Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is a systematic 
method of describing how work is organized in order to meet the overall objective of the job. It 
involves identifying in a top down fashion the overall goal of the task, then the various sub-tasks 
and the conditions under which they should be carried out to achieve that goal. In this way, 
complex planning tasks can be represented as a hierarchy of operations – different things that 




operations.  A short description of the other potential methods considered was taken from Embrey 
(2000). 
a. Operator Action Event Trees (OAET) are tree-like diagrams which represent the 
sequence of various decisions and actions that the operating team is expected to 
perform when confronted with a particular process event. Any omissions of such 
decisions and actions can also be modeled together with their consequences for plant 
safety.  
b. Decision/Action flow diagrams (DA) are flow charts which show the sequence of 
action steps and questions to be considered in complex tasks which involve decision-
making. Decision/Action Flow Diagrams are similar to the flow charts used in 
computer program development. Both charts are based on binary choice decisions and 
intervening operations. In general, the binary decision logic in Decision/Action charts 
expedites communications through the use of simple conventions and provides for easy 
translation of Decision/Action charts into logic flow charts for computerized sections 
of the system.   
c. Critical Action and Decision Evaluation Technique (CADET) is built on the critical 
actions or decisions (CADs) that need to be made by the operator usually in response 
to some developing abnormal state of the plant. A CAD is defined in terms of its 
consequences. If a CAD fails, it will have a significant effect on safety, production or 
availability.   
d. The Influence Modeling and Assessment Systems (IMAS) technique is used to elicit 
Subjective Cause-Consequence Models (SCCM) of process abnormalities from 




team regarding the various alternative causes that could have given rise to the 
disturbance and the various consequences which could arise from the situation.   
HTA was selected as the primary framework for the LCS model in this analysis for the 
following reasons:.  
a. HTA is an economical method of gathering and organizing information since the 
hierarchical description needs only to be developed up to the point where it is needed 
for the purposes of the analysis.  
b. The hierarchical structure of HTA enables the analyst to focus on crucial aspects of the 
task, which can have an impact on plant safety.  
c. When used as an input to design, HTA allows functional objectives to be specified at 
the higher levels of the analysis prior to final decisions being made about the hardware. 
This is important when allocating functions between personnel and automatic systems.  
d. HTA is best developed as a collaboration between the task analyst and people involved 
in operations. Thus, the analyst develops the description of the task in accordance with 
the perceptions of line personnel who are responsible for effective operation of the 
system.  
e. HTA can be used as a starting point for using various error analysis methods to examine 
the error potential in the performance of the required operations.  
Conversely, the two primary disadvantages of Hierarchical Task Analysis are: 
a. The analyst needs to develop a measure of skill in order to analyze the task effectively 
since the technique is not a simple procedure that can be applied immediately. 




b. Because HTA has to be carried out in collaboration with workers, supervisors and 
engineers, it entails commitment of time and effort from busy people   
There are other more cognitive approaches that may be better suited to the final analysis, 
but for the initial deconstruction of the bridge and engine room, HTA is a good technique to 
establish initial task structure.  For this study, the following deconstruction model was used as a 
baseline, to be tailored to the engineering plant and watch teams. The basic structure is outlined in 
Figure 1 below. 
 
  
Figure 1. Mission-Task Decomposition 
 
To apply the principles of HTA in IMPRINT, the Operations Analysis is broken into 
“Missions” which define a finite time period and desired outcome; “Functions”, which are large 
procedures (corresponding to “tasks” in the HTA breakout above); and “Tasks”, which are the 
steps in a procedure and allow for detailed human factors and cognitive analysis. The hierarchy 
will be apparent in the Results section as IMPRINT graphs are used to validate the workflow 






Mission: Watch Period: Safely operate the engineering plant  
a. Function: Operate Propulsion Equipment  
i. Task: Start up equipment  
ii. Task: Perform periodic maintenance   
iii. Task: Monitor operation 
iv. Task: Secure equipment  
b. Function: Operate Electric Plant  
i. Task: Start up equipment   
ii. Task: Perform periodic maintenance 
iii. Task: Monitor operation  
iv. Task: Secure equipment  
c. Function: Conduct Casualty Control  
i. Task: Take immediate casualty actions  
ii. Task: Restore equipment to safe condition  
iii. Task: Conduct follow-up actions  
iv. Task: Restore to original condition  
 There are two primary systemic delimitations for this project. Although there is significant 
failure data available in the ship’s Consolidated Maintenance Database, the data available for 
causality of the failures is relatively incomplete. There is sufficient data (approximately 6 years’ 
worth) for analysis, and this represents a large focus of effort in defining the ties between failure 
(quantitative data) and causes of failure (qualitative analysis).  Second, this project is tied to similar 
experiments with the IMPRINT software program, which may not turn out to be the ideal vehicle, 




that to date IMPRINT has only been applied to very small crews (5 or less) while the LCS crew 
size is 50, and IMPRINT has largely been applied to relatively static conditions. Meredith’s project 
expanded the environmental factors to include more dynamic operational events such as unplanned 
flight or boat operations, and significant casualties.  To address these limitations in this research 
project, a detailed task structure was developed for the IMPRINT model for the engineering watch 
team and is proposed for the purposes of this product to the Navy representatives.  This task model 
deconstructs the tasks into individual task elements at a detailed level by watch stander, maintainer, 
and system.  If gaps in historical failure data are found, they can be identified and targeted for 
collection efforts in the follow-on phases of the project during underway periods that are planned.  
Finally, the intention in this project was to examine possible improvements to the IMPRINT model 
and to note any areas that may require reconsideration or modification of the model to better fit 












2.1 REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF LITTORAL COMBAT SHIPS (LCS)  
The LCS mission is to operate offensively in the high-density, multi-threat littoral 
environment independently or as an integral member of a carrier strike group (CSG), expeditionary 
strike group (ESG), or surface action group (OPNAV, LCS Concept of Operations, 2003). A 
distinguishing feature of LCS is the concept of a modular, reconfigurable ship. There are two ship 
classes: Freedom class and Independence class. Although the two classes are very different in 
design, each meets a common set of key performance parameters. The ship is comprised of a ship 
system (basic hull, mechanical, electrical, and computing systems) and core systems that provide 
navigation, self-defense, command and communication (C2) and communications capabilities, as 
well as air, subsurface, and surface vehicle launch, recovery, handling, and control systems. The 
core systems provide the ship with the capability to detect, identify, track, and defend itself against 
anti-ship cruise missiles and threat aircraft, but the ship is not designed or intended to operate in a 
high-intensity air defense environment unless these operations are being conducted under the air 
defense coverage of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), or an air 
defense asset such as an Aegis cruiser or destroyer. The ship includes a large reconfigurable 
volume for Mission Packages (MP), which may be exchanged to modify the ship’s focused war 
fighting capability. Designed as an open architecture ship with tailored MP, LCS provides focused 
capabilities in the mine countermeasures (MCM), surface warfare (SUW), or antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW) mission areas. The SUW MP includes a maritime security module, which enables 




The MP include personnel required to operate and maintain mission specific equipment and to 
augment the core crew when conducting focused mission operations. In addition to its focused-
mission and self-defense capabilities, LCS may be tasked to conduct operations that take 
advantage of its inherent capabilities, defined as those capabilities enabled by the ship’s core 
systems, sprint speed, agility, mission bay space, and shallow draft. These may include operations 
such as special operations forces (SOF) support, search and rescue (SAR), freedom of navigation 
operations, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), global fleet station, maritime law 
enforcement operations, and irregular warfare. LCS is designed to operate in the littoral 
environment as a focused mission ship, which can be configured with SUW, ASW, or MCM MPs. 
Mission Packages (MPs) are integrated with the ship’s services, data links, unmanned vehicle 
controls and command, control, communications, computers and intelligence infrastructure. The 
MPs are transportable by ship or air, built for rapid reconfigurability and must be changed out in 
port. The MPs include personnel to support mission capabilities and to augment the core crew for 
tasks such as FP, watch standing, and administration. LCS provides self-defense against anti-ship 
cruise missiles, threat aircraft and surface threats. Due to its core systems, speed, agility and 
shallow draft characteristics, LCS provides the inherent capability to conduct a number of 
secondary missions on a limited basis, including Special Operations Forces (SOF) support, Search 
and Rescue (SAR), afloat forward staging base, freedom of navigation operations, global fleet 
station, maritime law enforcement operations, and irregular warfare. Engineering performance is 
critical to mission accomplishment across all MP’s and is thus a viable target outcome as a failure 




In breaking down the task analysis, this research focused on specific operational conditions 
and subsets for modeling. The LCS Concept of Operations (CONOPS) defines three operating 
conditions for conducting operations:  
a. Condition I: Battle Readiness. While in Condition I, the ship shall meet the following 
criteria:   
(1) Able to perform assigned focused mission area (SUW, ASW, or MCM) when 
configured with respective MP and perform limited non-MP related mission 
areas, or inherent capabilities, simultaneously.   
(2) Able to keep the required systems manned and operating for maximum 
effectiveness.   
(3) Required to accomplish only maintenance associated with mission critical 
repairs.   
(4) Evolutions such as replenishment, law enforcement, or non-mission helicopter 
operations are not applicable.  
(5) The maximum expected continuous crew endurance for Condition I is 24 hours.   
b. Condition II: Modified Battle Readiness. Condition II is Condition I modified to meet 
particular probable threats that are situation-dependent. As such, Condition II is a 
subset of condition I that stands up particular Condition I capabilities at the discretion 
of the commanding officer. While in Condition II, the ship shall meet the following 
criteria:  
(1) Able to perform focused mission (SUW, ASW, or MCM) areas when 




(2) Able to simultaneously perform those offensive and defensive functions 
necessary to counter specific probable, limited threats.   
(3) Able to keep required operational systems continuously manned and operating.   
(4) Able to perform other command and control (C2) functions relevant to the 
threats which are not required to be accomplished simultaneously.  
(5) Able to accomplish mission critical maintenance and support functions.   
(6) The maximum expected continuous duration for Condition II is 10 consecutive 
days, with a minimum of 4 to 6 hours of rest provided per crewmember per day.  
c. Condition III: Wartime/Increased Tension/Forward Deployed Cruising Readiness. 
Reduced defensive systems are manned to a level sufficient to counter possible 
threats. While in condition III, the ship shall meet the following criteria:   
(1) Able to keep installed and embarked focused mission (SUW or ASW or MIW) 
systems manned and operating as necessary to conform with prescribed ROCs.  
(2) Able to accomplish all underway maintenance, support and administrative 
functions.   
(3) To determine manpower requirements, the maximum expected crew endurance 
for Condition III is 21 consecutive days underway, with opportunity for 8 hours 
of rest provided per man per day, followed by 4 days in port.  
Since the key failures appear to have occurred during Condition III, this is the most 





2.2   OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS  
The IMPRINT program has been applied in the past to smaller combat equipment such as 
tanks.  Its application to the complex shipboard environment is not yet proven, although a previous 
phase of this experiment has shown it to be capable of mapping basic LCS crew functionality and 
operations under Condition III as described in paragraph 2.1.c. In a more global force level 
manpower study, “workload” is just simple engagement with high level activities.  In a detailed 
human performance model, workload is the mental capacity being utilized to perform more 
definitive tasks.  The detailed human performance models allow observation of outcomes such as 
mission times, mission completion, and errors and their consequences as metrics. The modeling of 
complex operations under varying conditions was challenging, but the measures of effectiveness 
in the Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Planned Operational Environment (POE) 
document provides a stable set of criteria with a well-defined structure that seems to lend itself to 
the IMPRINT model’s capabilities.  Data collection during real live operations may be subject to 
operational and funding limitations, but the initial plan does account for a great deal of flexibility 
in the conduct of the study. The IMPRINT Operations Model allows the operator to analyze the 
performance (such as time, accuracy, and workload) of a new weapon system by helping build 
models of each mission that the weapon system is capable of accomplishing. Models are built by 
breaking down the mission into a network of procedures defined as “functions”. Each of the 
functions is then further broken down into a network consisting of individual “tasks”.  When the 
program executes the mission model simulation, the analyst can study the range of results that 
occur in the mission. A description of the variability of each element can be obtained for further 
analysis.  IMPRINT Pro performs the simulation model based on how long it takes (based on 




estimate accuracy levels and assign workload values that reflect the amount of effort the 
Warfighters will have to expend to perform the task. During the simulation, IMPRINT Pro predicts 
task performance and calculates how much workload each Warfighter experienced throughout the 
mission. In this way, it is possible to determine whether the Warfighter were overloaded, and if so, 
how changes can be made to reduce the workload to an acceptable level.  At the completion of the 
simulation, IMPRINT Pro can compare the minimum acceptable mission performance time and 
accuracy to the predicted performance. This method was used to determine whether the mission 
met its performance requirements. Past researchers have modeled the LCS crews in a macro sense 
using the Force Unit model, which looks at how a Force Unit, a structured set of resources 
comprised of people and equipment, can succeed in meeting an emergency which demands those 
resources.  Using the model developed by previous researchers, this analysis utilized the 
Operations Model and a small subset of tasks in detail to investigate the effects of the 
aforementioned dimensions.   




CHAPTER 3  
PROJECT METHODOLOGY  
  
3.1  PROJECT DESIGN  
Data collection plan:  Since this engineering effort did not have direct access to the LCS 
automation-human operational environment, a directed, nonrandom survey was conducted to 
assess potential automation, human, and environmental variables contributing to observed failures.  
Once the key attributes were decided upon for the chosen mission, and the attributes to be entered 
determined, the method of measuring data was submitted and approved by the Old Dominion 
University Batten College of Engineering and Technology Internal Review Board as IRB 921238-
2, Littoral Combat Ship Staffing Model using IMPRINT, on 15 August 2016.  Inputs included 
objective (mission hours, mission objectives, achievement of specific milestones from the ship’s 
Required Operating Condition (ROC) document), and specific parameters that pertain to the 
mission itself – ranges, success in mine location, etc.  Finally, the crew was surveyed in terms of 
skills, experience, training level, proficiency, and in terms of performance – fatigue, workload, 
error rate, etc.  Due to the focused scope of the project, although surveys were completed by a 
variety of shipboard personnel, the focus was on a single key node, the engine room, since this is 
the area where the majority of decision-making occurs with the most severe potential 
consequences.  These parameters were fed into the model and refined to see if the results are 
repeatable and predictable to a degree that the model was validated.  
In-Situ measurements: Although this project does not include an in-situ research aspect, 




School studies (Kerno 2015,  Meredith 2016).  This data was reviewed and referenced as necessary 
to support or refute the findings of the LCS survey and other aspects of the analysis.  
Recommendations and adjustments:  Based on the validated model, the opportunity existed 
to adjust several of the attributes already inherent in the IMPRINT program to more closely tailor 
them to actual Navy parameters and use the results to formulate recommendations for changes to 
the model itself. One final desired outcome was the ability to modify the IMPRINT model so that 
it can be used in a predictive fashion for new ships such as the next generation Frigate FFG(X), 
which is the follow-on class to the LCS, and even the DDG-1000 class, which will face many of 
the same challenges.  The challenge is that unlike LCS, these are more multi-mission ships and 
may require several iterations of the IMPRINT analysis, as well as analyzing the interactions 
between mission areas. 
 
 3.2 MISSION PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION   
The LCS bridge is composed of a system of systems that integrate to provide command 
and control (in Navy terminology, “C2” that includes radars, cameras and visual operators to build 
a coherent surface and air picture of land, obstructions, and other air and surface vessels to support 
safe navigation and safe operations.  Unlike other classes of ship, the bridge system was designed 
from the ground up as an integrated “open architecture” system, with automated computer-
controlled functions augmenting the human crew and in many cases replacing crew members 
required on other surface ships.  This includes such systems as surface and air search radars, 
electronic navigation systems, and propulsion control systems that all culminate in a central Bridge 
Control Station from which an Officer of the Deck can change displays and control the ship with 




were made to actual LCS ships and to the LCS simulator/trainer to examine the human-automation 
interface and provide familiarization with the procedures and construct of the Integrated Bridge 
System (IBS).    
 
 
Figure 2.  Schematic of LCS Integrated Bridge System (IBS) (Source: US Navy) 
  
3.3 ANALYSIS OF BRIDGE AND ENGINEROOM ARCHITECTURES    
The Engine room of the LCS ships is designed for minimal manning, with most control 
functions residing at a watch station on the bridge.  Since the majority of engineering functions are 
automated, only one individual is assigned to roam the engineering spaces as a monitor and 
casualty responder for fires, flooding, etc.  One class is a combined gas turbine and diesel 
propulsion system with a reduction gear (called a “combining gear in LCS) and the other with a 
rotating water jet propulsion system.  The systems are unique to the LCS platform and are 
supported by a robust simulator training program called Train to Qualify (TTQ) such that almost 
all functions required to operate the engineering plant can be performed on a simulator exactly as 




considered an integral member of the bridge watch team and is focused exclusively on engineering 
plant control. The functional interface for both the IBS and the Engineering systems are separate 
but similar in design.  The majority of functions are controlled by an operator sitting in front of a 
series of computer monitors with touch-screen capability, using “soft buttons” on the screen to 
perform most actions such as starting and stopping pumps, closing and opening breakers, and 
aligning valves.  A large number of alarms relay the status of doors, valves, machines, and 
casualties such as fire and flooding via installed sensors.  The displays are essentially detailed 
“status boards” from which the operator can monitor parameters such as temperature, pressure, 
RPM, etc., selected by a series of menus and buttons on the screen.  Most operating procedures are 
contained in paper booklets that are maintained at the watch station for reference during routine 
operations and casualties.  Engineering roving watch standers can also perform some corrective 
and planned maintenance while on or off watch, and the bridge watch stander is often assigned 
corrective and planned maintenance, as well as other administrative duties, when not on watch.  
While the two LCS classes have different designs display styles, the overall concept – relying 







Figure 3. Photograph of LCS Bridge showing Human-Automation Interface equipment (IBS) 




3.4   LCS SURVEY DESIGN  
The concept of operations for the LCS program relies on highly trained operators (often 
spending 12-18 months in a “train to qualify” program) that may or may not have served on LCS 
ships in the past.  They use both bridge and engineering simulators for training as well as classroom 
instruction with qualified and experienced trainers.  A significant portion of planned and corrective 
maintenance is performed by civilian operators, contracted for periods when the ship is in home 
port. Shipboard control systems make extensive use of automation as part of the Navy's goal to 
reduce shipboard manpower requirements.  For this reason, the survey treated the LCS ship as an 
environment, with three integrated sub systems (human and automation) operating the bridge, 
engineering, and combat systems respectively.  While there is little interaction between the three 
subsystems, the degree of automation and interaction is similar for each.  Although there are the 




essentially the same between the two.  To date, some LCSs have experienced significant failures 
in mission accomplishment which have been attributable potentially to under staffing and over 
scheduling the human component of the automation-human LCS operational environment.  Initial 
analysis of failure modes seems to indicate that the critical human components on the Littoral 
Combat Ship are bridge and engine room staffing.    
The design of this survey was to determine the extent to which the dimensions of fatigue, 
maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and automation-human activity integration are perceived by 
LCS bridge and engine room personnel to impact the performance of their duties.  Survey results 
were used to inform the design of automation-human cognitive task and activity workflow analyses 
of LCS bridge and engine room activities.  Results of the workflow analyses, in turn, were applied 
to modify current LCS manpower models to optimize the integration of the automation-human 
operational environment for each operational state: peace-time steaming, war-time steaming, and 
combat operations.  Optimized LCS manpower models were programmed into the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s IMPRINT discrete event modeling tool and simulated to verify automation 
human operational performance.  For the survey, the following problem statement was 
investigated:   
What is the degree to which Littoral Combat Ship Class bridge and engine room 
personnel perceive that they are impacted in their watch and maintenance 
performance by understaffing and over scheduling the human component of the 
automation-human LCS operational environment as measured by the dimensions 
of fatigue, maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and human-automation activity 
integration?  
 The survey was designed to measure four dimensions identified as potentially 
contributing to failures of mission accomplishment.  Each dimension was defined as follows:  




b. Maintenance tasking - actual versus specified maintenance activities accomplishment.  
c. Watch tasking - actual versus specified watch task accomplishment.  
d. Automation-human activity integration - the extent to which littoral class ship automation- 
human cognitive-task and activity workflows have been designed to minimize the potential 
for operational errors.  
This survey was focused on bridge and engineering personnel.  The category “other” 
includes Combat Information Center and other support personnel that alternated standing watch or 
performing maintenance tasks. The survey opened with nine demographic questions directly 
related to littoral class ship personnel performance of duties. Questions are listed below by number:  
1. Primary group; E-7 or above, E-6 or below.  
2. Location of primary duties; bridge, engineering spaces, other.  
3. Number sea tours completed; first, second, third, fourth, five or more.  
4. Primary ship types of past tours; amphibious, cruiser/destroyer, no previous sea tours.  
5. LCS class variant; Freedom, Independence.  
6. Last underway period, hours per day standing watch; do not stand watch, less than 2, 2 to 
4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.  
7. Average hours/day of planned preventive maintenance; do not perform maintenance, less 
than 2, 2 to 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.  
8. Average hours/day of corrective maintenance; do not perform maintenance, less than 2, 2 
to 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, more than 10.  
9. Last underway period, hours per day normally slept; less than 4, 4 to 6, 6 to 8, 8 to 10, 




The survey questions were formatted in a 7-unit Likert scale:  1. Extremely unlikely, 2. Moderately 
unlikely, 3. Slightly unlikely, 4. Neither unlikely or likely, 5. Slightly likely, 6. Moderately likely, 
7. Extremely likely. 
Survey questions were originally presented in random order, as indicated by the question 
number, but are grouped by measurement dimension for ease of reference:  
Dimension: Fatigue   
10.  How likely are you to sleep at the same time each day?  
15. What is the likelihood that you will be fatigued while standing watch?  
16. What is the likelihood that you will be fatigued while performing maintenance?  
Dimension: Maintenance Tasking  
11. On an average day underway, what is the likelihood that you will have sufficient time to 
perform assigned preventive maintenance?  
12. On an average day underway, what is the likelihood that you will have sufficient time to 
perform assigned corrective maintenance?  
Dimension: Watch Tasking Workload  
14. What is the likelihood that you will be able to perform all scheduled tasks on your watch 
station?  
17.  What is the likelihood that you will encounter more tasks than you have time to perform?  
26.  What is the likelihood that you will be distracted by other tasks (i.e., planned or corrective 
maintenance, administrative) while standing watch?  
Dimension: Automation-Human Activity Integration  
18. What is the likelihood that you will clearly understand the difference between automated 




19. What is the likelihood that operating procedures are sufficiently detailed for you to operate 
your equipment?  
20. What is the likelihood that the automated features of your watch station make standing watch 
easier than on other ships?  
22. What is the chance that, when an automated alarm occurs, you trust that it is a real event?  
23. What is the likelihood that your watch station displays provide all the information you need 
to stand watch?  
24. What is the chance that I will clearly understand all the information displayed on the control 
panels for my watch station?  
27.  What is the chance that modifications to the information display and automation could 
mitigate effects of overtasking or fatigue at your watch station?  
Questions 13, 21, and 25 were inserted to test internal consistency and are not listed above.  
Questions 13 and 25 were randomly assigned as positive restatements of questions 11 and 15 
respectively.  Question 21 was randomly assigned as a negative restatement of question 20.  The 
results of the survey will be discussed in Chapter 4.   
 
3.5 PERFORMANCE INTEGRATION DESIGN 
  Once the data was collected and analyzed from the LCS Crew Survey, the IMPRINT 
modeling tool was used to build a model of the operational and maintenance tasking of a typical 
watch section consisting of the Remote Console Operator (RCO) and the Engineering Plant 
Technician (EPT).  The watch period “mission” was populated with a set of operating and 
maintenance procedures knows as “Functions” and the tasks associated with each function.  These 




manual, automatic, and cognizant functionality, and the model was run a number of times to 
simulate different conditions in terms of workload, fatigue, and automation across the spectrum of 
functions for the two operators.  The next sections describe the project results including survey 
results, construction of the IMPRINT model, and the tabular and graphical outcomes under various 
conditions.  Finally, conclusions are drawn from the results and recommendations made for 



























 PROJECT RESULTS  
 
 4.1 LCS CREW SURVEY RESULTS.    
The LCS Crew Survey was sponsored by the US Navy, and the survey design and 
methodology were reviewed and approved by the Old Dominion University Batten College of 
Engineering and Technology Internal Review Board. The survey was conducted in May-August 
2017 and was open for a period of 3 months.  E-mail invitations requesting participation were sent 
to crews on two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) that had completed recent deployments.  These two 
ships provided a sample of approximately 80 personnel;  The directed, non-random survey was 
voluntary and was conducted using Qualtrics™ survey software. Participants remained 
anonymous.  There were 35 responses out of a population of 80, representing a response rate of 44 
percent.  Based on hypergeometric probabilities, this response rate yields a 90% confidence of 
detecting a 5% difference and a 99% confidence of detecting a 10% difference in opinion on any 
given question. This was considered sufficient, since the population is relatively homogeneous for 
navy crew members of a single class of ship).  (Pearson Education, Probability Distribution, 2010).  
Respondents’ demographics were as follows.  
• 18 (51%) were E-7 or above and 17 (49%) were E-6 or below.  
• 10 (29%) primary duty location was on the bridge, 11 (31%) was in engineering spaces, 
and 14 (40%) were in other personnel.  
• 7 (20%) were on their first sea tour, 10 (29%) their second tour, 9 (26%) their third 
tour, 3 (8%) their fourth tour, and 6 (17%) on their fifth or greater tour.  
• 9 (26%) had prior tours on an amphibious ship, 20 (57%) on a cruiser/destroyer, and 6 




• 27 (77%) served on the LCS Freedom class and 8 (23%) on the LCS Independence 
class.  
• 4 (11%) did not stand watch, 2 (6%) stood watch 4 to 6 hours, 2 (6%) stood watch 6 to 
8 hours, 16 (46%) 8 to 10 hours, and 11 (31%) 10 or more hours.  
• 8 (23%) did not perform preventive maintenance, 6 (17%) less than 2 hours/day 
performing preventive maintenance, 11 (31%) 2 to 4 hours/day, 4 (12%) 4 to 6 
hours/day, and 6 (17%) 6 to 8 hours/day.  
• 10 (28%) did not perform corrective maintenance, 8 (23%) less than 2 hours/day 
performing preventive maintenance, 8 (23%) 2 to 4 hours/day, 8 (23%) 4 to 6 
hours/day, and 1 (3%) 6 to 8 hours/day.  
• 4 (11%) slept less than 4 hours/day, 24 (69%) 4 to 6 hours/day, 5 (14%) 6 to 8 
hours/day, 2 (6%) 8 to 10 hours/day.  
 Kendall’s tau was estimated to test internal consistency between positive questions 11 
and 13 and questions 15 and 25 and between negative questions 20 and 21.  Table 2 reports 
Kendall’s tau and corresponding p-values.  Overall, the tau signs and p-values support internal 
consistency.  
  
Questions  Relationship  tau  p-value  
11 – 13  Positive  +0.794  2.22e-16  
15 – 25  Positive  +0.772  3.58e-07  
20 - 21  Negative  -0.375  0.0067  





Exploratory analysis was used to examine the survey response data in each dimension for 
trends and anomalies in the LCS automation-human operational environment that may have to be 
considered in the subsequent design of the cognitive-task-automation workflow analysis. Three 
delimitations apply to this statistical analysis: (1) While the survey size was relatively small 
relative to pure research surveys, the survey purpose was only to assess potential automation, 
human, and environmental variables contributing to observed LCS failures.  (2) The use of the 
SCREE plot, Kendall’s tau analyses, and Multiple Joint Correspondence Analysis were used as 
supporting analyses of potential variables contributing to observed LCS failures.  (3) While it may 
have been appropriate to collapse the results into smaller anchored bins if the survey had been 
designed as a primary research measurement instrument, the 7-node Likert Scale was preserved to 
more clearly show the fidelity of the answers.  For this survey, exploratory analysis was performed 
within each measurement dimension:  
Dimension: Fatigue. This section focused on the respondents’ perception of sleep and 
fatigue, and their impact on watch standing and maintenance.  The responses to question 10, 
likelihood of sleeping at the same time each day, resulted in a bi-modal distribution.  Thirty-four 
percent (34%) reported that it was unlikely, with the mode at 14% moderately likely, and forty-
nine percent (49%) likely, with the mode at 34% moderately likely.  The question then arose as to 
whether this bi-modal distribution was related to primary duty station.  Table 5 indicates that a 
relationship exists between the likelihood of sleeping the same time each and primary duty station.  
Bridge and Other personnel displayed bimodal distributions with 8 bridge personnel responding 
unlikely and 2 likely and 7 other personnel responding unlikely, 1 neither, and 6 likely.  
Engineering personnel tended more strongly toward unlikely with 9 responding unlikely, 1 neither, 






1  2  3  4  5  6  7  
Bdg  3  2  3  0  1  1  0  
Eng  5  2  2  1  1  0  0  
Oth  5  1  1  1  1  4  1  
Table 3. Count of sleep-same-time to primary duty station.                                                            
*Likert Scale Score where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = Very Likely 
 
  
Responses to question 15 indicated that ninety-two percent (92%) of respondents were 
likely to be fatigued while on watch with seventy-seven percent (77%) percent reporting 
moderately or extremely likely.  Similarly, responses to question 16 indicated that seventy-one 
percent (71%) of respondents were likely to be fatigued while performing maintenance with fifty-
seven percent (57%) reporting moderately or extremely likely.  Of note, none (0%) of the 
respondents chose “Moderately Unlikely or “Extremely Unlikely” in either of these categories. 
This result tends to suggest that fatigue is considered a significant factor in both activities, and 
merits further research. For the discussion of determination of outliers, reference section Multiple 






Figure 4. Fatigue Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = Very 
Likely; Outliers – no fill.) 
  
Dimension: Watch Tasking Workload.  This section focused on the respondents’ 
perception of the potential for “overtasking” as it related to the time available to complete assigned 
tasks.  Question 14 measured watch tasking workload balancing.  Here respondents formed either 
a bi-modal distribution.  Eighty-three percent (83%) reported neither or likely ability to perform 
all scheduled tasks at their watch station.  Of the 17% reporting unlikely to perform all scheduled 
tasks, four were in Engineering, and two in the Other category.  Question 17 was designed to 
determine the sufficiency of watch tasking workload design.  Eighty-three percent (83%) reported 
that it was likely that they encountered more tasks than they had time to perform with sixty-eight 
percent (68%) reporting that encountering unplanned task was moderately or extremely likely.  Of 
the 83% reporting likely, twenty percent (20%) were bridge personnel and 31.5% each were 
Engineering and Other personnel.  Question 26, distraction by other tasks, was designed to assess 
the randomness of unplanned task arrivals versus the ability of personnel to control when they 




four percent (74%) of respondents reporting that it was likely that unplanned tasks were a 
distraction.  Of the 74% reporting likely, thirty-one percent (31%) were Other personnel, twenty-
nine percent (29%) were Engineering personnel, and fourteen percent (14%) were Bridge 
personnel.  Responses to questions 17 and 26 suggest that personnel feel overtasked in both watch 





Figure 5. Watch tasking Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = 
Very Likely; Outliers – no fill) 
  
Dimension: Maintenance Tasking.  This section examined the respondents’ perception of 
their ability to perform both assigned corrective and preventive maintenance tasks.  The 
distributions for both questions 11 and 12 were negatively skewed with respective modes at 
response 5 for question 11, preventive maintenance tasks, and 4, corrective maintenance tasks.  
For question 11, preventive maintenance tasks, forty-six percent (46%) responded that it was likely 
that they had sufficient time to complete preventive maintenance tasks, but a substantial minority 




maintenance tasks, forty-three percent (43%) responded that it was likely that they had sufficient 
time to complete corrective maintenance tasks, but, again, a substantial minority of twenty-six 
percent (26%) responded that it was unlikely.  For question 11, the likely-unlikely combinations 
were Bridge 14% - 6%, Engineering 14% - 14%, and Other 17% - 11%. For question 12, the likely-
unlikely combinations were Bridge 11% - 6%, Engineering 14% - 14%, and Other 20% - 6%.   
Combining these response rates with those of Watch tasking questions 17 and 26 suggests that 
planned preventive and corrective maintenance tasks are not level loaded across watches and that 
personnel have to deal with unplanned tasks on an overload basis.  Figure 6 summarizes 




Figure 6. Maintenance Response Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely and 7 = 
Very Likely; Outliers – no fill) 
 
Dimension: Automation-Human Integration.  This area explored the impact of automation and 
human integration as it relates to the watch station.  Questions 18, 19, and 20 sought to measure 




percent (86%) responded that it was likely that they clearly understood the difference between 
automated functions and those they are expected to perform. The responses to question 19, 
operating procedures are sufficiently detailed for you to operate your equipment, resulted in a 
bimodal distribution.  Seventy-one percent (71%) responded that operating procedures were 
sufficient, but twenty-six percent (26%) responded that procedures were not sufficient.  Table 4 
indicates that engineering and other personnel were more likely to respond that operating 
procedures were sufficient, but Bridge personnel were more evenly divided on procedures 
sufficiency. Responses to question 20, automated features make standing watch easier, resulted in 
a negatively skewed distribution with forty-five percent (45%) responding likely and thirty-four 
percent (34%) responding unlikely.  Table 5 indicates that bridge personnel tended to view 
automation assistance more positively than engineering personnel and other personnel.   
 
Station  Unlikely  Likely  
Bridge  11% (4/35) 17%  (6/35) 
Engineering    6%  (2/35) 26%  (9/35) 
Other    9% (3/35) 28%  (10/35) 
Totals 26% (9/35) 71% (25/35) 
 
Table 4. Relationship procedures sufficiency. 
 
 
Station  Unlikely  Likely  
Bridge    9% (3/35) 17% (6/35) 
Engineering  11% (4/35) 14% (5/35) 
Other  14% (5/35) 14% (5/35) 
Totals 34% (12/35) 45% (16/35) 
 






Figure 7. Q18, 19, 20; Human-Automation Distributions. (Likert Scale where 1 = Very Unlikely 
and 7 = Very Likely; Outliers – no fill) 
  
Questions 22, 23, 24, and 27 sought to measure the effectiveness of automation-human 
information exchange and comprehension.  As shown in Figure 8, question 22, trust in automation 
alarms, resulted in a bimodal distribution with forty-three percent (43%) responding they were 
likely to trust automation alarms and forty-six percent (46%) responding that they were unlikely 
to trust automation alarms.  Questions 23, 24, and 27 resulted in predominantly likely responses.  
Question 23, your watch station displays provide all necessary information, resulted in seventy-
one percent (71%) likely and twenty percent (20%) unlikely responses.  Of the unlikely responses, 
two were bridge personnel, one was engineering, and four were other personnel.  Question 24, 
chance that I will clearly understand all display information, resulted in seventy-four percent 
(74%) responding that they were likely and eleven percent (11%) responding that they were 
unlikely to understand.  Of the unlikely responses, one each was bridge and engineering personnel, 
and two were other personnel.  Question 27, chance that modifications to the information display 
and automation could mitigate effects of overtasking or fatigue, resulted in a negatively skewed 




Of the unlikely responses, one was from the bridge and two each were engineering and other 




Figure 8. Q22, 23, 24, 27 Human-Automation Distributions (Likert Scale where 1 = Very 
Unlikely and 7 = Very Likely; Outliers – no fill). 
  
Multivariate Joint Correspondence Analysis (MJCA).  Multivariate Joint Correspondence 
Analysis (MJCA) is a method of determining whether a survey’s responses demonstrate 




square distance cloud of points which is then analyzed in the geometric space to partition the 
survey information into cluster centers of mass, noise, and outliers, which are the structural 
information in the geometry.  Analysis of the LCS survey data using the R statistical application 
“ca” showed that the first four dimensions were responsible for 49.0% of the cumulative principle 
inertia (eigenvalues), with the fifth dimension raising the cumulative inertia to 54.8% (Table 8).  
Camiz and Gomes (2015) note that only the eigenvalues larger than the “trivial average ½“ are 
interpreted as significant.  Thus, multivariate correspondence analysis was limited to the mapping 












1  0.179731  18.3  18.3  ******  
2  0.156112  15.9  34.1  *****  
3  0.086036  8.7  42.9  ***  
4  0.060173  6.1  49.0  **  
5  0.056722  5.8  54.8  **  
  
Table 6. SCREE Plot of First 4 Dimensions from LCS Survey 
 
Dimension 2 Versus 1 Analysis  
The biplot in Figure 9 of the full survey response data on dimension 2 versus dimension 1 
coordinates with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse yield a coefficient of correlation of -
0.00914 and show that the mass of the data is identically, independently distributed (IID).  The 





Figure 9. LCS Survey, Full – Dim 2 v 1. 
 
 
observation along with the observation that dimension 1 explains 18.3% of the variation and 
dimension 2 an additional 15.9% (cumulatively 34.1%) leads to the conclusion that there is no 
structural information in the IID data. Examination of the biplot indicates that the survey responses 
partitioned into three clouds, the IID data plus two outlier clouds.  Table 7 reports the mass, quality, 
inertia, coordinates, and contributions of the data in outlier cloud in the lower right corner of the 





name  mass  qlt  inr  cor1  ctr  cor2  ctr  
15-4  6  687  16  935  282  - 
1122  
405  
18-4  6  689  17  778  178  - 
1318  
511  
19-4  2  572  11  956  172  - 
1457  
400  
23-4  6  689  17  778  178  - 
1318  
511  




Table 7.  Full – Dim 2 v 1 Lower Right Outlier Cloud 
  
Question 15 asked “… likelihood that you will be fatigued while standing watch …,” and the 
response 4 was “neither.”  Examination of the Figure 1 “Fatigue – Q15WFag” frequency plot and 
Table 6 indicates that a response of 4 was low mass and medium quality whose inertia is due 
primarily to it large coordinate distances.  Thus, response 4, shown with no fill color, should be 
considered as not belonging to the mass of the response 5 – 7.  The interpretation is that fatigue is 
an important predictor of watch performance.  Similar analysis of question 18, “…   likelihood   
that   you   will   clearly understand the difference between automated functions and those you  are  
expected to perform …,” shows that response 4 does not belong to the mass of response 5 – 7, 
which further supports that LCS personnel understand the difference.  Analysis of question 19, 
“… likelihood that operating procedures are sufficiently detailed …,” question 23, “… likelihood 
that your watch station displays provide all the information you need …,” and   question   24, “… 
clearly understand all the information displayed …,” yield the same conclusion.  The 4 Neither 
response does not belong to the mass of either the unlikely or likely subgroups.  Responses to 




number of responses indicate some procedures may not be sufficiently detailed to provide all the 
information needed to stand watch.  Of the personnel responding unlikely to question 19, 4 were 
bridge personnel, 2 engineering, and 3 “other”.  Of personnel responding unlikely to question 23, 
2 were bridge personnel, 1 engineering, and 4 other personnel.  Responses to question 24 should 
be considered as supporting LCS personnel understanding of display information.    
  
name  mass  qlt  inr  cor1  ctr  cor2  ctr  
10-4  4  668  12  - 
1324  
531  - 
673  
137  
11-1  6  758  16  - 
1386  
608  - 
690  
151  
12-1  4  612  14  - 
1278  
428  - 
838  
184  
18-1  4  503  15  - 
1177  
246  - 
828  
167  
18-2  2  396  12  - 
1246  




Table 8. Full – Dim 2 v 1 Lower Left Outlier Cloud 
  
Question 10, “… How likely are you to sleep at the same time each day …,” response 4 
exhibited the same low mass and medium quality with its inertia due primarily to its large 
coordinate distances.  The two neither responses do not belong to either the unlikely or likely 
subgroups. As with questions 19 and 23, the responses to question 10 should be considered as from 
two separate subgroups. Of those responding unlikely to question 10, 8 were bridge personnel, 9 
were engineering, and 7 were Other.  Of those responding likely, 2 were bridge personnel, 1 was 
engineering, and 6 were other personnel.  Questions 11 and 12 response 1 and question 18 




primarily to large coordinate distances. Questions 11, having “… sufficient time to perform 
assigned preventive maintenance …” and 12, having “… sufficient time to perform corrective 
maintenance …” both response 1 each indicate that the extremely unlikely responses are outliers 
not belonging the population mass in Figure 6.      
Dimension 3 Versus 2 Analysis  
Figure 10 presents the biplot of the full survey response data on dimension 3 versus 
dimension 2 coordinates, again with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse.   The coefficient 
of correlation between the response frequencies was -0.09505.  Like dimension 2 versus dimension 
1, the mass of the data is normally IID with some outliers and do not clearly map to either 
dimension 2 or 3.  Dimension 3 adds only 8.7% explanation of the variation (cumulatively 42.9%).  
Again, this leads to the conclusion that there is no structural information in the IID data of the first 
three dimensions. Question 17 with response 2, questions 18 and 24 with response 1, question 20 
with response 7, and question 27 with response 3 form one set of outliers near the bottom of the 
confidence ellipse.  From Figure 2, Question 17, “… likelihood that you will encounter more tasks 
than you have time to perform,” the three unlikely responses 2 were clearly not members of the 
dominant likely  population.  It is noteworthy that all response 2’s were bridge personnel.  From 
Figure 4, Question 18, “… understand the difference between automated functions and those you 
are expected to perform,” and from Figure 5 Question 24, “… clearly understand all the 
information displayed on the control panels for my watch station,” response 1’s do not belong to 
the negatively skewed distributions.  The one response 3 for Question 24 is not statistically 
different from the negatively skewed distribution.  The two responses 1 for Question 18 were other 
personnel, and the three responses 1 for Question 24 were one bridge personnel and two other 




watch station make standing watch easier…,” does not belong to the 1-6 response distribution.  
The 7 response was a bridge personnel.  From Figure 5, the one response 3 to Question 27, 
“…chance that modifications to the information display and automation could mitigate effects of 
overtasking or fatigue…,” does not belong with the 1-2 or the 4-7 responses and was from a bridge 
personnel. The other three outlier response 4’s in the upper left quadrant of Figure 4 were Question 
18, Question 19, “…operating procedures are sufficiently detailed…,” and Question 23, “… watch 
station displays provide all the information you need….”  This indicates that the responses for 
these questions are bimodal with the 4 responses not belonging to either mode.  The three 4 
responses for Question 18 were one bridge and two other personnel.  For question 19, it was one 
other personnel, and, for question 23, it was one bridge and two other personnel.  
  
 




Dimension 4 Versus 3 Analysis  
Figure 11 presents the biplot of the full survey response data on dimension 4 versus 
dimension 3 coordinates, again with a bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse.   The coefficient 
of correlation between the  response frequencies  was -0.07381.  Like the prior dimensions, the 
mass of the data is normally IID and do not clearly map to either dimension 3 or   4.    Dimension   
4   adds   only    6.1% explanation of the variation (cumulatively 49.0%).  Again, this leads to the 
conclusion that there is no structural information in the IID data of the first four dimensions.  
Examination of the biplot indicates that the survey responses are now distributed about the 
confidence ellipse rather than being partitioned into distinct clouds.  Outlier responses to questions 
17 response 1, 18 responses 1 and 2, 20 response 7, and 24 response 1 were identified and discussed 
for prior biplots.  Questions 11 and 12, “…sufficient time to perform assigned preventive 
(corrective) maintenance…” response 7’s do not belong to the negatively skewed distributions in 
Figure 6.  Likewise, question 16, “… be fatigued while performing maintenance …,” response 3 
does not belong to the 4-7 likely response distribution of Figure 4.  
Demographics  
Figure 12 presents the biplot of full survey demographics data on dimension 2 versus 1 
coordinate, with the bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse for only the demographics.  There 
are two outliers.  Last underway period, hours per day normally slept, Q9_HrsSleepL6_8, for 
normally sleeping 6 to 8 hours per day, maps primarily to the Dimension 2 negative axis.  This 
demographic data point is most closely associated with the Figure 9, dimension 2 versus 1, outlier 
cloud responses fatigued 15-4, understanding automated functions 18-4, detailed operating 
procedures 19-4, and watch station information 23-4, which suggests an association between 6 to 





Figure 11. LCS Survey, Full – Dim 4 v 3. 
 
 
The outlier for number sea tours completed, Q3_ToursFourth,    maps    primarily   to   the    
negative dimension 1 axis.  Again, this demographic is most closely associated with the Figure 6, 
dimension 2 versus 1, outlier cloud responses sleep time 10-4, preventive maintenance time 11-1, 
corrective maintenance time, and understanding automated functions 18-1 and 18-2.  This 
association may be due to the low mass of the 3 personnel (8%) responding that this was their 
fourth tour.  Conversely, 6 personnel (17%) responded that they were on their fifth or greater tour.  




sea duty experience and transition training before being assigned sea duty on a highly automated 
vessel such as an LCS.  
 
 
Figure 12. LCS Demographics – Dim 2 v 1. 
 
Figure 13 presents the biplot of demographics data on dimension 3 versus 2 coordinates 
with the bivariate normal 95% confidence ellipse for only the demographics.  Again, only 
responses Q9_HrsSleepL6_8 and Q3_ToursFourth displayed as outliers.  Figure 13 presents the 
biplot of demographics data on dimension 4 versus 3 coordinates with the bivariate normal 95% 
confidence ellipse for only the demographics.  One additional demographic outlier for last 




four hours per day, maps primarily to the Dimension 4 negative axis.  There are no response 
outliers in the lower right quadrant of Figure 8, Dimension 4 versus 3, with which this demographic 
outlier maps.   
 
 
Figure 13. LCS Demographics – Dim 3 v 2 
 
Survey Discussion   
The goal of the survey was to determine if, in the opinion of experienced LCS 




maintenance duties is impacted by the highly automated LCS environment.  Integration of 
response frequency histograms and multiple joint correspondence analysis partitioning of 
responses into cluster centers  of  mass, noise, and outliers revealed response patterns that support 
the conclusion that the LCS automation environment does impact performance of watch standing 
and maintenance duties.  Analysis of the demographics (Supervisory Duties, Primary Duty, and 
Experience) support that survey results were consistent across all three variables, with one outlier 
being those with four tours, which is not unexpected given the Navy’s sea shore rotation of 3-5 
years – someone in this category would be very senior, and not many personnel at this level are 
assigned to a single ship.  Question 9 (Hours of Sleep) seemed very concentrated for all 
demographics between 4 and 6 hours (69%), which is not surprising given that most of the 
individuals surveyed stand the same watch schedule.  This amount of sleep reported by the 
respondents is significantly below that recommended in Navy Policy (7 hours) and is consistent 
with the results of the Fatigue section of the survey; it stands to reason that there is a relationship 
between low hours of sleep, not sleeping at the same time (lack of a circadian rhythm) and 
operators being fatigued while performing maintenance and standing watch.   
 Returning to Figure 4, Fatigue Response Distributions, responses to question 10, 
likelihood of sleeping at the same time each day, partition into two groups, seventy-seven 
percent (77%) are unlikely to do so.  and twenty-six percent (26%) likely to do so.   This sleep 
pattern is negatively associated with the responses to question 15 likely of being fatigued while 
standing watch and question 16 likely of being fatigued while performing maintenance tasks.  
Returning to Figure 5, Watch tasking Response Distributions, only the three response 3’s 
were outliers for question 17, strengthening support  for  the perception  of encountering more 




tasks, and question 26, being distracted by other tasks, suggests that LCS personnel prioritize 
accomplishment of assigned tasks and response to other unplanned tasks as they can.  This may or 
may not be the best prioritization plan given the criticality and potential impact of other unplanned 
events.  The distribution of responses to having sufficient time to perform preventive and 
corrective maintenance tasks in Figure 3 are negatively skewed with adjusted 35% unlikely and 
44% likely for preventive maintenance tasks and 21% unlikely and 42% likely for corrective 
maintenance tasks.  Again, as with watch tasking, there may be unplanned tasks impacting some 
engineering personnel’s ability to complete maintenance tasks.  Evaluation of the automation-
related question 20 indicated that a slight majority of respondents, 44%, seem to feel that the 
automation on LCS made their watch standing easier than on other ships, but 35% responded that 
automation made watch standing more difficult.  After omitting outliers for question 18, 
understanding the difference between automated and manual functions, all responses were likely.  
After omitting the outlier for question 19, sufficiently detailed operating procedures, responses 
partitioned into two groups; 26% unlikely and 74% likely.  
Returning to Figure 8, question 22, trusting automated alarms, resulted in a relatively 
uniform response rate with 49% responding unlikely and 40% responding likely.  After adjustment 
for the three outliers, question 23, workstation displays supply sufficient information, the 






                                           Figure 14. LCS Demographics – Dim 4 v 3 
 
Closer evaluation of the automation-related questions indicated that a slight majority of 
respondents (54 percent) seem to feel that the automation on LCS made their watch “more 
challenging” than on other ships (question 21).  Conversely, the distribution for a similar question 
(20) was much closer to a standard bell curve, about the same majority responding that the 
automation made their watch “easier” than on other ships.  The responses to these questions did 
show a bit of a dichotomy in that while the answers to the more positive questions (18, 19 and 20) 
were skewed heavily toward the “likely” side, the more negative question (21) was also skewed 




display modification could mitigate overtasking and fatigue, provide insight into the LCS 
automation-human interface design.  An adjusted 96% responded likely to question 24 that they 
understood display information.  Conversely, 68% responded likely to question 27 and 12% 
responded unlikely indicating a small proportion of LCA personnel find that display information 
contributes to overtasking and fatigue.  Given that the demographic biplots (Figure 14 is the final 
one, included for continuity) were statistically homogeneous but multiple outliers were observed 
in the response biplots, it can be concluded that the design of and training for the LCS automation-
human operational environment assumes a standard Navy personnel profile and does not account 
for natural differences in human capabilities.  This strongly suggests a need to revise the design of 
the human component in the manning model of the LCS environment to identify and integrate 
management of failure risk due to variance in natural human capabilities.   
  
4.2  PERFORMANCE DECOMPOSITION 
 Workflow Analysis:  Workflow analysis is a process in which businesses examine the 
progression of workflows to improve efficiency. Workflow analysis identifies areas for 
improvement; for example, by improving workflows, resources are used more efficiently, and staff 
is better able to work to capacity.   There are myriad techniques and software programs for 
workflow analysis, including IMPRINT, but most have a rather deterministic approach (as seen 
earlier in the HTA section of this paper).  Some researchers have maintained that in looking at 
systems that may include a high degree of automation, as well as human-automation interfaces, a 
cognitive element is required.  As noted by Karwowski and Ward (P.513): “Work measurement 
models must be based on both work and job design in addition to a paradigm of human 




work situations, from routine performance to stressful encounters with accidental events, is 
needed” (Karwowski and Ward, 2016). 
Using the approach above, the set of critical selected for analysis, are broken down into 
task elements with a matrix to capture both the task and the applicable “swim lane” using a task 
analysis worksheet, which categorizes the elements of each step as follows:  
a. Physical Elements: Those elements which are dependent upon human sensing (i.e., 
auditory, tactile, etc.)  
b. Cognitive Elements: Those elements that depend on human thinking and decision 
making (i.e., weigh alternatives, make decision)  
c. Automation Elements: Those elements associated with automated functions (i.e., 
display status, calculate function.  
The task analysis worksheet in Figure 15 displays all the elements and is an example of a completed 






Figure 15: Sample Time-Motion Analysis Worksheet 
 
A similar Time-Motion Analysis Worksheet was prepared for each of the nine “critical tasks” as 
part of the proof of concept.  These are included as Appendix G.  
Failure Mode Analysis:  Once the high-risk procedures had been identified and broken 
down into discrete tasks for workflow analysis, a FMEA risk analysis (Figure 16) was performed 
to identify potential failure modes, occurrence distributions, and impacts.  This allowed for the 
generation of a failure action plan (FAP) for each failure mode (human or automation) using 
standard Failure Mode Analysis techniques.  To support this process, the author developed a 
tailored worksheet (Figure 17) to capture the critical failure tasks identified in the Time-Motion 
Analysis Worksheet, determine the degree of risk by applying a 1-10 scale to the Severity (SEV), 




Number (RPN) that can then be used to determine the tasks within each procedure that present the 
highest risk of impacting mission (including severe injury/death and major equipment damage).    
Once steps are identified, recommended actions can be hypothesized to reduce the risk, by 




Figure 16: Failure Analysis Worksheet (Page 1 of 2) 
 
The spreadsheet above can be filled in for each task to by analyzed using the below key, modified 
from a standard FMEA spreadsheet which was slightly tailored to address the Navy-specific 
parameters that would apply to normal at-sea operations based on operator experience.  While 




conforms to the norms used in Navy Operational Risk Analysis processes (OPNAVINST 
3500.39C, July 2010).   
 
  
Figure 17: Failure Analysis Worksheet Key (Page 2 of 2) 
 
From the Time Motion Analysis Worksheets prepared for each critical task, a FEMA 
worksheet was prepared to address the critical failure modes, causes, and recommended solutions 
from each one, and the resulting (potential) improvement in risk were these recommendations to 
be implemented.  When the tasks are plugged into IMPRINT, an attempt will be made to insert 
these mitigations and compare mission performance results before and after to see if performance 
improvements or degradations can be noted.  In addition, the IMPRINT models can be used to 




fatigue for comparison.  A discussion of the “Reports” function of IMPRINT and example results 
from this analysis are presented in the following section.  
  
4.3 IMPRINT FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE MODELING  
The current models used to model shipboard manning are based on calculations of gross 
workload, such as watch, maintenance, training, etc. but do not provide a level of detail that allows 
any type of workload analysis or modeling of anticipated working conditions such as fatigue, 
overtasking, or the effects of automation.  The use of modeling software for The IMPRINT 
program was developed by the Army as a means to model workload in individuals and teams and 
is ideally suited for military crews since they often work in small teams, even if they are a subset 
of a larger force.  The Navy could easily adapt the IMPRINT model for shipboard manning, adding 
a layer of fidelity to the model that has not been possible and allowing manpower planners to 
assess risk to mission and impact of external factors to the process, allowing for better informed 
decisions.    
IMPRINT is a software program based on the C# code protocols, and allows for a series of 
models by Force, Operators, and Maintainers, as well as Support Personnel.  It can be used to 
construct a series of missions, functions, and tasks, and is also capable of identifying operations 
and tasks performed by humans as well as by machines, or automation.  Once the basic tasks are 
constructed into a network “function”, the individual tasks can be simulated using a series of 
defined parameters, including time, accuracy, and assigned parameters for degree of difficulty in 
areas including auditory, visual, cognitive, etc.  Once the operators are built, and the mission 




experience, and other “human” variables that can influence the outcome.  A sample network 
display (in this case, an Army tank mission) is shown in Figure 18.  
 
  
Figure 18. Sample IMPRINT Workflow Diagram (Function Level).  
  
The settings (time requirements, accuracy criterion, shown in the upper right corner) are 
based on either experience and/or information about the specific system, educated assumptions, or 
a distribution of a type selected by the analysist.  The mission can then be run in real time and 
compared against specific desired or acceptable outcomes, such as acceptable failure rate or a 




compared to various outcomes as parameters are varied based on experience.  In practice, this 
method has been utilized by the United States Army to simulate the crew of an Abrams M1A1 
tank and support manning decisions for future consideration.  
 IMPRINT can also be used in conjunction with other software simulations such as Fatigue 
Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST), a model used to predict operator effectiveness based on sleep 
and work schedules.  The assumption inherent in this paper is that IMPRINT, combined with FAST 
and informed by in-situ measurements and surveys of crew members will validate its potential as 
a planning tool in determining future manpower requirements for Navy ships.  A schematic of this 











Figure 20: FAST Software Graph of Predicted Effectiveness (Source: Naval Postgraduate School 
Crew Endurance Handbook, 2017, Pg. 3) 
 
 
IMPRINT has been used in small crew situations, for example a 4-person Tank crew, to 
determine the feasibility of combining workload tasks and reducing the number of operators.  In 
one case, predicted failure rates of the proposed manpower reductions were sufficient to inform 
the decisionmakers and influence the outcome of a tank crew manning study (Allender, 2014).    
  
4.4  IMPRINT PERFORMANCE DESIGN   
The Naval Postgraduate School has created a detailed model of the LCS FREEDOM class 
crew using the Forces Model in IMPRINT, which forms the basis for this study.  In conducting 
initial research for this study, it was apparent that the predominance of mechanical failures in the 




team of individuals who stand watch and maintain equipment in the Engineering Department, 
using a watch and work schedule designed around the Standard Navy Work Week (now called the 
Naval Allowance Factor).  This reference gives a notional breakdown of each major element of a 
workday.  For this analysis, key portions of the day were defined as a “mission” and various 
“functions” assigned to the crew members during these periods.  As previously noted, the 
Operations Model of IMPRINT allows a detailed analysis of specific functions and tasks as they 
relate to cognitive function and performance.  A schematic of the NAF is shown Figure 21. 
   
  
Figure 21: Standard Navy Work Week (after OPNAVINST 1000.16L, NAVY TOTAL FORCE 





 Numerous studies have shown that the actual hours worked and slept vary somewhat for 
the crew members in actual ships at sea, and these empirical numbers could easily be used in 
future studies to determine impact of manning shortfalls, excessive workload, or reduced 
effectiveness of automation.  For the purpose of standardization for comparison, and since there 
are multiple initiatives underway to better align manning and workload to the design parameters, 
this study used the Navy standard as the baseline.  
LCS Study Impact.  Based on the aforementioned survey of two LCS crews discussed in 
section 1 of this chapter, the following conclusion applies:  
“The four dimensions of human cognizance, task workload, maintenance, and 
automation-human integration are important for consideration in refining the 
IMPRINT model in the next phase of this research. Specifically, a majority of those 
surveyed feel that fatigue, overtasking, and the degree of automation inherent in 
the current manning model for LCS present significant challenges.  This leads to 
the conclusion that these areas merit further detailed research cognitive/physical 
task workflow analysis, refinements to the existing IMPRINT modeling algorithms, 
and possible modifications to the overall manning construct to address identified 
potential deficiencies.  Additionally, an examination of specific areas of automation 
and the human system interface may be appropriate.  Based on the survey results, 
the researchers performed cognitive/physical task workflow analysis of bridge and 
engineering tasks, as well as examining past failures, and build an initial IMPRINT 
crew model that accounts for the four survey dimensions in the next stage of 




The IMPRINT program has embedded algorithms to apply some of these factors, but as 
limitations are encountered, some recommendations for modification may follow.  The following 
breakdown addresses the domains addressed in the workflow analysis. 
Watch:  There are several required functions on a ship that are performed around the clock 
by a specifically qualified individual called a “watch stander”.  In order to perform these functions, 
an individual must be “on watch” for a given period.  Since the Navy manning model uses a 3-
section rotation underway as a baseline for manning calculations, this was used as the basis for the 
breakdown of hours in this study as well.  An individual on watch has a relatively discrete list of 
duties during this period, consisting of monitoring equipment parameters, patrolling the workspace 
(in this case, the engine room), starting, stopping, and operating various pieces of equipment, and 
responding to casualties.  IMPRINT allows the analyst to build a set of Functions based on these 
duties, each with a discrete set of tasks to accomplish that function.  For a watch stander, the basic 
reference for most activities is called Engineering Operating System (EOSS), which consists of a 
series of operating procedures in relatively discrete activities and a set of defined tasks.  These are 
sorted by type, either by Operating Procedure or Casualty Procedure.  There are hundreds of 
individual procedures, and it would be possible to model each one of them in IMPRINT, but since 
a given operator is unlikely to perform more than a few per watch period, a reasonable model can 
be developed, based on experience, to simulate a notional watch period with a defined set of 
functions.  The specific operating and casualty EOSS procedures chosen for the model was defined 
later in the paper and explained in detail.  Overall, the combination of a sequence of operations 
can simulate a “normal” watch period, and casualty procedures can be inserted into the model to 
determine their impact on the crew members both individually and as a team.  For example, a 




over a watch, but he may have to give and receive reports to other members of the watch team or 
coordinate some actions with them or with personnel outside the watch team.  He may also have 
to use automated functions to complete some tasks that support a particular function.  If a casualty 
occurs, the watch stander may have to leave his station or turn his attention to the casualty, and 
another crew member may have to take over the responsibilities of the normal watch.  This could, 
in turn, impact that individual’s ability to perform other tasks, depending on where he or she was 
in the workday – maintenance left unaccomplished, loss of sleep resulting in fatigue, etc. could 
result in other impacts in that individual’s model.  The casualty could also result in a loss of certain 
equipment or loss of automation, making subsequent watches more complex and perhaps 
increasing the probability of other failures.  IMPRINT has the ability to model each of these 
situations, but in order to validate the model, some assumptions must be made to build a 
“reasonable” set of parameters to simulate one set of situations, and a determination must be made 
as the value of building multiple scenarios versus the time and effort/cost involved.  A sample 
“Function” is modeled Figure 22 as an example (detailed IMPRINT protocols used in this model 






Figure 22. IMPRINT Workflow Example (Task Level) 
  
Maintenance:  The Navy recognizes two distinct types of maintenance, Planned and 
Corrective.  Planned maintenance is based on several historical models, including expected failure 
rates and modes, mean time between failure, degree of automation in monitoring, and other 
engineering factors.  It is built around a series of Maintenance Requirement Cards (MRC) 
performed on a specific piece of equipment at a specified periodicity.  The majority of these 
procedures area relatively short in duration (0.5-3 hours) and while most are performed by a single 
operator, some require multiple personnel for part of the task or to act a safety observer.  Each 
MRC includes discrete sections for safety precautions, tools and materials, notes and warnings, 
and a step-by-step procedure.  The experience level and type of individual (called “rating”) is 
designated on each MRC, as is the amount of time expected to perform the maintenance in 




calendar schedule, such as daily, weekly, monthly, annual, etc.); Situational (performed when a 
specific event occurs, such as getting underway, shooting a gun, etc.) and Unscheduled (performed 
when a minor discrepancy is discovered and can be repaired on the spot in a short amount of time).  
Other types exist in the maintenance deck, but they occur either with limited frequency or are 
associated with long in port periods and are thus unlikely to be performed during underway periods 
used for this analysis. To determine a realistic set of MRC “functions” to be performed as subsets 
of this mission, historical data was examined by experienced operators and maintainers and a 
reasonable set of MRCs was chosen. As with the EOSS procedures, there are hundreds of 
individual procedures, and future analyses could use the same process to eventually model each of 
them in IMPRINT to cover most possible combinations.  There are other assumptions associated 
with Planned Maintenance, such as the amount of preparation time required to assemble tools and 
materials, secure and tag out the system, and restore the system to full capability. These are 
captured in Navy documentation for manning calculations and can be entered into the IMPRINT 
model as well.  Finally, there is a certain amount of time dedicated to data entry and scheduling, 
as well as periodic manager spot checks which would be part of a normal routine.  The model also 
accounts for the means by which an operator interacts with the automated systems, defined as 
“Resources”; for each of these areas, common values can be entered to assist in calculating the 
overall workload, any interferences, and overall impact on mission success.  These resources are 







Table 9. Resources and Interfaces. (Source: IMPRINT User’s Guide 2012, pg. 73.   
Reprinted with permission) 
 
The remaining “missions” from the standard Navy Work Week (Sleep, Messing, Admin, 
Training, Personal Time) would not require the detailed operations modeling, as the missions, 
functions and tasks associated with these are essentially singular in nature and can me simulated 
with a fairly simple model.  These include sleeping, eating, training, admin and personal time.  
They have distinct periods represented in the standard Navy Work Week and would have to be 
assigned priority in the case of other unplanned events; a crew member responding to a drill may 
miss training for example, which could detriment future level of knowledge, or sleep, resulting in 





impact, and thus detailed modeling of these periods missed is not required.  A sample work day 
might resemble that in Table 10. 
 
 
Table 10. Breakdown of 24-hour day by work domain. 
 
 
By “modeling” the members of a watch section for a 24-hour period, the individual 
missions and tasks can be examined for workload and probability of failure.  By varying the 
schedule (for instance, 3 section watch instead of 4, as shown above. The IMPRINT model can be 
tailored to various schedules and the results compared.  Previous studies have shown that there is 
a significant difference in fatigue levels for watch standers in a circadian, 4 section fixed schedule 




on a correlation between predicted and observed levels) which shows clear differences.  The goal 
of an IMPRINT model would be to capture the effect of these increased fatigue levels induced by 
reduced number of watch sections and translate that into a risk of failure for a given set of tasks.  
A comparison of these watch rotations and the resulting levels of effectiveness is shown Figure 
23.  
  
Figure 23. Predicted Effectiveness of a 5-on/10-off, 3-section watch rotation.  (Hollins and 
Leszczynski, 2014, p. 28) 
  
 
In the above graph, the gradient between yellow and red represents what standard military planners 
define as “acceptable” level of effectiveness, or roughly the level of impairment corresponding to 
a Blood Alcohol Level (BAC) of 0.08, or legally drunk.  
Modeling every possible mission, function and task for a 50-plus person crew under several 
operating conditions would create a model with an almost endless variety of layers and outcomes.  
While this is obviously the most robust option, a series of informed decisions, based on either 




to be modeled to a more reasonable number, allowing the model to run as a “proof of concept” and 
showing its viability.  Tailoring these results based on the input of real operators as seen in the 
2016 survey results can further refine the problem and support the thesis that this model is 
representative of the larger space, and perhaps justify the expense and time of creating a more 
complete model.  A summary of the project delimitations is related below. 
Operators: The Littoral Combat Ship has a base crew of 50 personnel, divided into 3 major 
Departments: Engineering. Combat Systems, Operations.  The Modules (designed for a specific 
warfare area) have a separate crew with operators and maintainers.  For this study, Engineering 
Department was chosen since the majority of the known failures have occurred on Engineering 
Equipment.  Engineering Department is further divided into two divisions, Electrical and 
Mechanical.  Since individuals from both divisions stand watch and perform planned and 
corrective maintenance on the equipment in this department, one individual from each division 
was modeled. In addition to performing maintenance, these individuals stand watch as part of a 2-
person team, with one Officer or Chief Petty Officer acting as the supervisor, and one Mechanic 
and one Electrician as subordinate watch standers.  Officers are not modeled in IMPRINT and 
rarely operate equipment, so the model is limited to the two enlisted crew members.  The watch 






Table 11: LCS Underway Watch (Condition III) Rotation - Red circle shows Engineer Team. (A 
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MANPOWER ANALYSIS, Mckinnya J. Williams-Robinson, 
Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007 p.30)   
 
 
Equipment:  The major components that provide propulsion and electric power are main 
engines (two gas turbine and two diesel), two diesel generators for electric power, and associated 
support systems including lube oil, cooling water, air conditioning, and electrical distribution 
system.  Since known failures have occurred in several of these components, all were considered 
for the analysis, although only a selection of operating and maintenance procedures was modeled 
for proof of concept.  
Operating Condition:  Since the majority of the failures have occurred during normal 
steaming underway, and since this is basis for existing Navy manpower models, the LCS is 






Procedures: There is a very large set of procedures related to maintenance and operation of 
the LCS platform.  In order to conduct a proof of concept and modeling to the detail required, a 
sampling process is necessary.  While many options are available to select a final set of procedures 
for a proof of concept, the process defined below is based on a combination of experience, 






The procedures used by the crew generally fall into one of 3 categories.  
1.  Corrective Maintenance:  The procedures for corrective maintenance are usually 
developed on a case by case basis, but they are generally based on failure data stored 
  
  




in a document called the Consolidated Ships Maintenance Project, or CSMP.  The 
entries in this system are sorted by system and component, often referred to as 
“parent” and “Child”.  There is an entry for each failure and each one includes the 
following data fields:  
   
 
Entry Block  Information  
Hierarchal Sequence Number  A discrete identifier for the system and component  
Location  The physical location of the component  
Problem Description  A freeform paragraph describing the failure – cause, 
severity, impact  
Recommended Solution  The  ship’s  recommendation  for  a 
 repair procedure  
Reference  Technical Manual or Maintenance Procedure  
Priority  1 through 4 based on mission impact (1 is highest)  
Date  The date discovered  
 
Table 12. Navy Corrective Maintenance Job Description Criteria 
  
A typical LCS ship has approximately 1200 total entries at any given time, and they 
can be sorted by system to find the systems with the highest number of failures.  For 
this analysis, a 6-year data set was analyzed consisting of 20,245 entries, of which 
some 10% were “placeholders” for scheduling of inspections, etc.  The remaining 




them into categories by type of equipment (i.e., Diesel Engine, Navigation, etc.).  This 




Figure 25. Pareto Chart of LCS Failure Data (6-yr summary) 
  
In order to determine the best subset to focus the analysis, the results of the first Pareto 
chart were weighted using a “Mission Impact” scale of 1 to 3 (1 being lowest, 3 
highest) to focus on the discrepancies with the highest potential impact of failure to 
mission. The decision for rating a system 1 to 3 was based on operator experience 
and the known mission failures mentioned earlier in the paper. This generated a 




















Figure 26. Weighted Pareto Chart (accounting for mission impact)  
 
Based on this information, a selection of individual jobs was selected for modeling 
from the HSC components listed in the top 50% of the Pareto Analysis.  This was 
also the criteria for selecting Operating and Planned Maintenance Procedures for 
modeling in the next steps.  Delimitation.  In researching the documentation for 
maintenance and operations, as well as the causes of the most significant failures, it 
was found that engineering procedures were generally more accessible and presented 
a more robust case for modeling.  For these reasons, further analysis was limited to 
engineering procedures for corrective maintenance, planned maintenance, and 
operations. 
2. Engineering Operating Sequence Procedures:  These are formal procedures used to 
define operation of the Engineering Plant.  These are generally 1-2 pages long and 
provide step by step directions to be, followed by the operators.  For the engineering 
















categories: Routine and Emergency Procedures.  Based on the known incidents of 
failure and the record of failure data contained in the maintenance records of LCS-1, 
the following procedures were selected for risk analysis (the full matrix is included 
as appendix E):  
  
EOSS  
Nr.  Component  Title  
CAEPA  Electric Plant  Alignment Procedures  
FSST  
Service  and  Storage  
Tanks  
Stripping water and contaminants  
FOMT  Fuel Oil Transfer Pump  Align for Remote Operations  
FOAS  Fuel Oil Service System  Align for Operation  
CPTM  Gas Turbine Brake  Operation, motoring  
CPDME  Main Propulsion Diesel  Starting/Operating/Stopping  
CLOP  Lube Oil Pumps  Starting/Stopping  
CFOP  Fuel Oil Pumps  Starting/Stopping  
BGTM  B Fire GTM  B Fire  
CASF  Electric Plant  Bus Tie Parallel  
CASSDG  Cool Air  Failure  
CASG  Gas Turbine Generator  Fire  
CSFG  Diesel   Fire  
CED  Educator  Operation, motoring  
CFD  Fuel  Sample Detector  
CFOSS  Boats  Fuel  
CFP  Fire Pump  Operation, motoring  
CFMPO  EDG  Console Operation  
CHAA  CHT  Alarm  
MLOL  Main Lube Oil  Pump Operation  
CPTM  Console  Operation  
CPWS  Potable Water  Operation, motoring  
CFSRT  Fuel System  Refuel Helicopter  
EPOP  Electric Plant  Operation, motoring  
 











Nr.  Component  Title  
EPT  Power Turbine  Vibration  
FOAS  Fuel Oil System  Align  
GTES  Gas Turbine  Start  
HBDG  Hot Bearing  Casualty Response  
FPM  Fire Pump  Operation, motoring  
 
Table 13.  Initial selection of Critical Operational Procedures (continued) 
 
 
3. Planned Maintenance Procedures:  These are formal procedures that are used to 
conduct routine maintenance on engineering equipment.  They are categorized by 
system in a document called a Maintenance Index Page (MIP) and then by individual 
Maintenance Requirements Cards (MRC).  The work centers that perform 
maintenance on engineering equipment are machinists (EA Division) and electricians 
(EE Divisions).  There is a total of 76 MIPs in the EA division PMS schedule, and a 
total of 875 individual MRC’s.  Based on the weighted Pareto analysis above, the 







MIP  MRC  Nomenclature  
2331  4M-5  Diesel Engine Governor Lube  
   4-M6  Inspect LO Pump  
   9M-1  Engine Test  
   M-1R  LO Sample  
   M-6  Inspect Air Filter  
   R-3D  LO Viscosity Test  
   W-1R  Inspect Loop Seal  
2341  8M-1  Power  Turbine LO  Sample  
   A-9  Inspect LO Cooler  
2342  A-1  GT Oil Sample  
   W=2R  Test GT LO Flash Point  
2418  M-1R  Clean Air Filter  
   M-2  Replace Air Filter  
   R-34M  Test Air Flow  
   R-33D  Reduction Gear Pilot  Light  
2531  R-4D  Stern Seal Leakage  
   R2-W  Flash Point Test  
2471  R-10W  Drain Water from Filter  
256     Seawater Cooling  
 
Table 14. Initial Selection of Planned Maintenance Procedures 
  
 
The full risk matrix is included as Appendix D.  From the above procedures, a select 
few were used as a representative sample for modeling using the risk analysis method 




4.5  IMPRINT MANPOWER MODEL VERIFICATION    
In order to evaluate the integrated system using IMPRINT, an integrated Risk Analysis 
must be performed in the various procedures to select a defensible subset for analysis.  Risk 
analysis consists of determining the combination of “likelihood” and “severity”  of a particular 
event in order to determine its impact.  Table 15 represents a standard risk analysis chart and shows 
the resulting risk values in a generic fashion. Table 16 is that three-dimension risk analysis tailored 
to LCS Procedure Analysis Protocol.  Table 17 specifies the risk definitions applied to each level. 
  
  
Table 15.  Standard Risk Analysis Table 
  
In order to define risk in more precise terms to support this analysis, a 3-Dimensional Risk Matrix 
was developed by normalizing the Navy vernacular (For example, the Navy assigns 4 levels of 
“impact” and of “likelihood” in their maintenance and casualty documentation.  The next step 
consists of combining the criteria from the above table into a single table that accounts for all three 




were correlated to the standard risk matrix (for example, the highest value is a 4x4x4=64).  The 
results are shown in Table 18. 
 
 






Table 17.  Tailored Task Risk Matrix Definitions 
 
 
Final Selection of Procedures:  Due to the extensive detail required for IMPRINT modeling 
and the focus of this “proof of concept”, this analyst selected 3 procedures from each category 
(Corrective Maintenance, Planned Maintenance, and Operating Procedures) to build a complete 
workflow model and program IMPRINT. These three were selected based on the following 
criteria:  
a. Related to a high impact documented failure  
b. A risk factor of Yellow or Red  
c. A mix of levels of automation from mainly human/mechanical to highly automated 
Table 18 represents the results of this analysis for the Operating Procedures as an 














Failure Mode and Effects Analysis:  Once the tasks have been selected for modeling based 
on the risk of mission failure as described above, the next process to be applied is the Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis.  The basic steps of this are defined below:  
a. Define the system  
b. Define ground rules and assumptions  
c. Construct system block diagrams  
d. Identify failure modes  
e. Analyze failure effects and causes  
f. Feed results back into design process   
In order to accomplish this, a total of 9 tasks were selected, 3 from each area (corrective 
maintenance, planned maintenance, and operational procedures).  A standard tool for the above 
analysis is called the Out of Control Action Plan, or in this case the IMPRINT Action Plan, which 
was a plan adapted and built for each procedure to be analyzed using the critical failure modes to 
capture design changes that may be required.  An example Critical Failure Analysis for one of the 





Figure 27. Modified Action Table for LCS Analysis (entry into IMPRINT) 
  
Using the Task Analysis Worksheets, each task is broken into its discrete subtask elements 
and critical failure modes are identified.  Once these have been identified, the cause and effects 
noted, and results can be programmed back into the model.  Model runs can then be compared to 
determine if risk of failure changed due to these updates, resulting in possible improvements.  The 
below form was developed to capture the critical failure modes of the key steps in each procedure, 







Table 19. Failure Mode Analysis Key and Example. 
 
 Workload:  IMPRINT captures the workload for each operator compared to a user selected 




IMPRINT, and corresponds to other research showing that this is the point at which a skilled 
operator becomes “task saturated” and has to either prioritize or shed tasks in order to accomplish 
the mission (Columbi et al, pg. 454).   A report is then generated that shows the actual workload 
over the course of the mission against this threshold.  The below graph is an example of a single 
run of the IMPRINT scenario with the graphs of the workload vs. time of the two Engineering 
operators (RCO and EPT) as they execute the watch duties.  By setting thresholds in workload and 
comparing the results of multiple runs, the changes in workload can be visualized and the effects 
of changing a single parameter (for example, hours without sleep) can be seen.  In the figure below, 
for example, the effects of an alarm at time 21:36 can be seen as a short spike in workload; in this 










The above graph would be extremely useful in comparing workloads of operators under a variety 
of conditions, and to demonstrate the effects of unplanned events that may distract from the task 
at hand (i.e., the alarm circled in the diagram above) or more encompassing events like a casualty 
response to a fire or flooding, which could consume the entire watch team for a significant portion 
of the watch period.  IMPRINT can also capture instances and specific tasks where workload 
exceeds the threshold and may result in a task failure and, if that task is linked to accomplishment 
of the mission, a complete abortion of the mission.  Such an analysis would show what parts of a 
particular procedure would contain the highest risk of failure in a modeling scenario and allow for 
consideration of changes to the manpower level, the procedure, or the time allotted for the 
procedures.  One consideration in constructing the watch period for this model was that there was 
a set of operating procedures, a planned maintenance procedure, and a corrective maintenance 
procedure scheduled for the 3-hour period, resulting in a high concentration of workload at period 
when operators (mainly the EPT) were trying to multi-task.  IMPRINT also has a simulation 
function to capture the cognitive aspects of various tasks and model how they interfere with one 
another – for example the sound of an alarm interfering with concentration while attempting to 
follow a procedure or give a verbal order.  An example of this is shown below.  This sample shows 
the potential of IMPRINT workload functionality to model a fairly complex work period using 







Table 20. Resource Interface Cognitive Interferences. 
  
Fatigue: IMPRINT can also model the fatigue of the operator as a Performance Shaping 
Factor (PSF) that can be toggled between choices of “Sleepless Hours” from 0-24, 25-48, and so 
on.  In this example, the Watch Period mission was executed with the default setting of 0-24 
Sleepless Hours.  The initial run shows a task failure rate of only 4 failures, as shown in Table 21.  
  
  
Table 21. IMPRINT Task Failure Report (PSF “Sleepless Hours” set at 0-24) 
 
After the above mission run, the “Sleepless Hours” for both operators was changed to “25 to 48” 







Table 22. IMPRINT Task Failure Report (PSF “Sleepless Hours” set at 25-48 hrs.) 
  
When the “sleepless hours” is set to “25-48” a total of 11 failures occur, a 275 percent increase.  
While some of these can be attributed to the variability in the IMRINT model, this data clearly 
demonstrates that the error rate increases dramatically when hours without sleep is increased, and 
that IMPRINT is capable of modeling this effect.  In practice, this result can be further 
deconstructed to show the actual impact of fatigue on each task associated with each mission as 






Table 23. IMPRINT Task Summary showing effects of changing Sleepless Hours PSF 
  
 
The above table shows the effects of fatigue in several areas. Specifically, a large number 
of tasks (as in the blue highlighted task) show an increased time to complete them, a reduced 
accuracy, and a decreased probability of success.  An expanded table shows an example of these 
specifics (Table 24). 
 
 
Task 5.1 Attribute/  
Sleepless Hours  
0-24 hrs.  
  
25-48 hrs.  Delta  
Time (hr./mm/ss)  00:15:00  00:16:04  +01:04  
Accuracy (%)  96.27  90  -6.27  
Probability of  
Success (%)  
84.13  64.55  -19.59  





 An additional possibility in IMPRINT is to run multiple iterations of a mission and 
capture the results in terms of mission success.  The following graphs show the increase in 
mission failures when sleepless hours are increased from “0-24” to “25-48”.   A two-sample p-
test was conducted in Minitab 18® for statistical difference Ho: p (25-48; 41/150 = 0.273) – p (0-
24; 34/150 = 0.227) equal 0 versus Ha: not equal 0.  The Minitab output reported no statistical 
difference with p-value = 0.351. and 95% confidence interval (-0.0512, 0.1445).  This lack of 
statistical difference is most likely an artifact of IMPRINT’s lack of categorical resolution of 
sleepless hours 0-24 and sleepless hours 25-48.  Studies over the last 50 years have demonstrated 
that the relationship between fatigue and hours sleep deprivation is asymptotically increasing 
one.  Benitez, et al. (2009) modeled the effect of sleep deprivation on performance over the range 
of zero to 72 hours.  They found that relative reaction time increased over the range of zero to 
20-hours, approximately leveled (with caffeine) or slightly declined (with no caffeine) up to 
about 40-hours deprivation, increased between 41 and 48-hours deprivation, leveled or slightly 
declined between 49 and 65-hours, and increased up to 72 hours.  Given the noise in their data 
and averaging over 0 to 24 hours and 25 to 48 hours, as in IMPRINT’s categorical ranges, there 
should be no statistical difference in the observed p-values. The results are summarized below: 
 
Test and CI for Two Proportions  
 
Sample   X    N  Sample p 
1       41  150  0.273333 
2       34  150  0.226667 
 
 
Difference = p (1) - p (2) 
Estimate for difference:  0.0466667 
95% CI for difference:  (-0.0511892, 0.144522) 






Figure 29. Graph of mission failure comparison for multiple runs (n=150) with aborted missions 
on the left of each graph and successful missions on the right. 
 
 
This selection of reports is the basis for the discussions and conclusions in the next chapter 
and is intended merely to demonstrate the range of information available from the IMPRINT model 
and the potential to model a wide variety of missions, functions and tasks.  
Automation-Human Interface: IMPRINT is primarily designed as a human operator model, 
and as such the algorithms for automation are designed to operate in an optimal manner – that is, 
success is automatically 100 per cent and workload capacity is assumed to be infinite (IMPRINT 
User’s Guide).  In working with the designer, however, it is possible to create a simulation for the 






Looking again at the workload diagram from above, the circle captures the “system” tasks and 




                         Figure 30. IMPRINT Workload Graph showing Automation (simulated).  
 
  
While the actual programming of this feature would require access to the automation functionality 
and is beyond the scope of this project, this process could be coded into IMPRINT and could 
eventually be used to better capture a more realistic simulation of automation, especially once 
detailed failure data was available, perhaps in a future research project.  This feature would be 
especially helpful as ships become more and more automated.  
   








5.1  OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS.   
The project started with a hypothesis that the LCS Crew modeling could be improved by 
using the IMPRINT program, which had been used extensively in Army applications and to some 
extent in analysis of the LCS crew, could be improved using data derived from crew surveys and 
an examination of the actual procedures (watch, operations, and maintenance) used by crew 
members, to modify the Operations Module of IMPRINT.  The majority of the studies conducted 
in the past used the Force Model feature of IMPRINT; in this more global force level manpower 
study, “workload” is just simple engagement with high level activities.  In a detailed human 
performance study using the IMPRINT Operations Model used in this project, workload is the 
mental capacity being utilized to perform more definitive tasks.  The detailed human performance 
models allow the analyst to consider outcomes such as mission times, mission completion, and 
errors and their consequences as metrics. The LCS Crew survey was intended to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses in manning model of the LCS automation-human operational 
environment.  It was important to use statistical analysis to validate the design and response 
coherence of the survey itself.  Consistency analysis confirmed that the results of the survey were 
coherent.  Multivariate analysis confirmed that the four dimensions sampled were independent, 
and LCS personnel responses support that they are relevant to the design of automation-human 
performance. Demographics were statistically homogeneous and independent of the survey 




and perform similar maintenance duties and other tasks, whether supervisory in nature or not, for 
about the same amount of time each day.  
The four dimensions of fatigue, maintenance tasking, watch tasking, and automation-
human integration are important for consideration in refining the LCS manning model to be 
incorporated and tested in an IMPRINT model in the next phase of this research. Specifically, a 
majority of those surveyed feel that fatigue, overtasking (watch and maintenance), and the degree 
of automation inherent in the current manning model for LCS present significant challenges.  This 
leads to the conclusion that these areas merit further cognitive/physical task workflow analysis 
toward refinements to the existing LCS manning model.  Additionally, an examination of specific 
areas of the automation-human system integration may be appropriate.  One of the most significant 
findings of this survey came from the joint analysis of the MJCA demographics and response 
biplots.  Joint analysis suggests that the design of and training for the LCS automation-human 
operational environment assumes a standard Navy personnel profile and does not account for 
natural differences in human capabilities.  
Based on the survey results, we performed cognitive/physical task workflow analysis of 
bridge and engineering tasks, as well as examining past failures, and built an initial IMPRINT 
crew manning model that accounts for the four survey dimensions in the next stage of research.  It 
is worth noting that this survey was conducted only for the LCS class of ships; this does not imply 
that these challenges are unique to LCS; perhaps an expansion to other classes of ship is worthy 
of an expanded follow-on survey.  References listed below were utilized in developing the survey 





The workflow analysis structure performed in this paper does seem to support the viability 
of this approach to model crew activity.  While this study focused on a small sample (about 20% 
of the sum total of procedures in each area) that were chosen based on risk analysis, the process 
proved to be relatively straightforward and repeatable to expand the study to model the entire 
spectrum of maintenance and operations for the engineering team, and then transpose this process 
onto the bridge and other teams for a more complete analysis that is beyond the scope of this 
project.   
The combination of the lessons from the LCS IMPRINT survey, which validated that 
operators perceive challenges with automation, overtasking, and fatigue as valid concerns in 
accomplishing assigned missions and the workflow analysis performed in support of this article 
form the foundation for a contribution to the body of work related to crew modeling in the future 
using IMPRINT.  Specifically, the impact of human-automation integration and fatigue on 
workload completion and on risk to mission success are not captured under current manpower 
models, which treat each human equally without regard to human factors or limitations of the 
automated portion of the machine-human interface, an ever-increasing trend in ship design. 
  
5.2  RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
Other Solutions Found.  In exploring the IMPRINT software, it does seem to have the basic 
building blocks necessary to model a broad range of missions, and other areas of exploration into 
the primary mission areas (i.e., Mine Warfare) would be possible applications since these “mission 




Additional Problems Identified:  Initially, the project required a steep learning curve to 
build an Operations model in IMPRINT, since previous research was focused on the Crew Model, 
which focuses on a broader perspective and does not “drill down” to the task level.  In attempting 
to translate Navy procedures into IMPRINT models, a few challenges were identified:  
a. Lack of detail in procedures.  The majority of Navy procedures are simply a set of 
steps, with limited explanation of the reasoning behind the procedures and, in areas 
of automation, no detail in what the automated system is actually doing.  This made 
failure analysis challenging, as the analyst has to rely on experience to understand 
the system responses.    
b. Lack of a Navy Tailored version of IMPRINT.  The baseline IMPRINT scenarios 
and crew models are based on an Army schematic, and while many of the attributes 
carry over and tailoring was possible for a Navy scenario, having the baseline already 
implemented in IMPRINT would have saved a great deal of programming time as 
the process developed.  
c. Lack of definition of the Human-Automation interface.  The procedures do identify 
which steps require interaction with the automated systems and the expected 
responses, but there is no delineation that clarifies the role of automation, leaving it 
up to the analysist to decide as to the degree of automation.  In this case, the author 
has a good deal of experience with Navy ships and automated systems, so educated 
estimates were possible.  
d. Fatigue Modeling in IMPRINT.  The Navy’s primary modeling tool for the effects 
of fatigue is the FAST tool, which provides a detailed output in terms of 




input.  Unfortunately, the IMPRINT model, while it does have a fatigue element in 
the human-factors module, is limited in fidelity (a pull-down menu for “hours without 
sleep”: 024 hrs., 24-48, etc.) is useful but does not capture the Navy model of a 
rotating or fixed watch schedule.    
 Recommendations for Future Performance Improvement:  If the Navy wanted to use 
IMPRINT as a tool for modeling the entire crew of a ship at the Operations Model, a few 
changes would greatly facilitate this effort, specifically.  
a. FAST Model integration.  Many of the crew surveyed perceived fatigue as an 
impediment to mission accomplishment.  A way to integrate the output of the FAST 
model directly into IMPRINT would allow for much more fidelity in determining the 
effects of manning and watch rotation changes on the level of risk to mission resulting 
from these changes.  This could be accomplished in the “Performance Shaping” 
module of IMPRINT.  There is an add-on that can be implemented but it was not 
used in this particular analysis, and it could be tailored for future detailed studies 
using actual crew fatigue data.  
b. Navy Crew Tailoring.  While demographics was considered as part of the LCS crew 
survey, there is a possibility that it could factor more heavily into future more detailed 
analysis.  To facilitate future modeling efforts, the detailed specialties (Navy Enlisted 
Classifications) could be pre-loaded into IMPRINT and a watch assignment matrix 
based on ship’s manning documents could be programmed in as a baseline for future 
analysis and updated to reflect current doctrine and requirements, as well as better 




There are versions of this in existence that could be tailored to match ship manpower 
profiles.  
c. Increased visibility of the Human-Automation Interface. As automation increases in 
Navy ships, the procedures could be improved by providing more detail on the actual 
degree of automation and the failure modes/expected responses to assist operators at 
various levels of training in utilizing the procedures.  The current LCS pipeline is 
over 18 months long and could be perhaps shortened if the procedures and automation 
were more comprehensive and transparent.  
d. For more complex and detailed modeling, one recommendation would be to assign 
the task to a small team consisting of a Navy Subject Matter Expert, an IMPRINT 
expert, and a researcher with extensive experience in workload modeling.  This 
would dramatically increase the speed of building the model and improve the 
accuracy and validity at several stages, including the risk analysis and time-motion 
analysis.  Observation of some of the tasks to validate times and effects would also 
be an improvement that was beyond the scope of this initial proof of concept.  
 
 
5.3  RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
There were two limitations to the risk analysis process: (1) the risk analysis of the 
procedures would have benefitted from a “colleague interrater reliability” exercise, subjecting the 
decision process to multiple subject matter experts to refine the solution, and (2) the risk analysis 
was not subjected to review by actual Naval personnel; these are mitigated by the fact that the 




merely to serve as a means to support the proof of concept. These two steps would be a 
recommended improvement for future research and would add rigor to an analysis that would be 
used to support decision making. 
There were two limitations related to changes in the LCS crews since the survey was 
completed: (1) the LCS crew manning policies have changed since the completion of the initial 
survey, including increased manning, modified crew composition, and the implementation of 
circadian watch rotations; these were not accounted for in this analysis but would be worthy of 
note and comparison in a future survey.  (2) In the interim, the size of the respondent pool has 
increased.  These changes would need to be accounted for in any future survey and are mitigated 
by the fact that the survey was not the main effort of this project but was merely intended to inform 
the IMPRINT modeling process scenario failure modes, and thus a less robust sample size was 
deemed acceptable in this context. 
To truly capture the interactions between crew members and teams, a similar study would 
be necessary including all three watch teams on the bridge and in engineering.  Limited access to 
detailed procedures for the bridge and the varied nature of bridge operations and maintenance 
(compared to the fairly narrow scope of engineering operations) would require a broader 
application of this analysis.  This “proof of concept” was able to show that, with minor 
modifications, the IMPRINT program can be used to model more complex aspects of the Sailor 
workload using existing documentation and task structure of differing levels of tasking (or 
overtasking), automation, and fatigue and the resulting changes in risk of failure in discrete teams.  
As demonstrated in the IMPRINT modeling runs, as each of these factors is increased, the risk of 
mission failure increases.  While this was only a limited study, it lays the foundation for a more 




adding a fourth watch section to reduce fatigue) or improving the explanation of failure modes in 
procedures with a high level of automation so that operators can gain a better understanding of 
what the automation is or is not doing.  By examining a small subset of the crew, focused on areas 
where previous mission failures can be associated to either overtasking, understaffing, lack of 
understanding of automated features, or fatigue, designers can achieve a better prediction of the 
impact of manpower decisions.  This work can be a foundation upon which a model of the entire 























6.1 PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS STUDY     
The primary contribution of this analysis is a “Proof of Concept” that demonstrates a viable 
method of applying a Time-Motion Risk Integration process to model Human-Automation 
workflow as a tool for operational risk analysis.  Other contributions are as follows:  
a. The LCS Crew Survey showed that fatigue, workload, and the human-automation 
interface are perceived by experienced crew members as factors that impact the ability 
of the crew to operate and maintain the ship. This is an important data point that could 
be used as a starting point for future surveys or analyses without the need to validate 
the veracity of the survey, which was confirmed herein by robust statistical analysis.  
b. The detailed workflow analysis process for Navy procedures could be implemented as 
developed here to dramatically expand the number of procedures available for a future 
use of IMPRINT.  Since the “proof of concept” demonstrated that IMPRINT has the 
capability to model the workload of a small watch team using the Naval Allowance 
Factor (formerly Navy Standard Work Week) and crew model, this model could be 
used to build a more complete “library” of operating and maintenance procedures that 
could be used in an expanded model.  
c. The analysis provided a template for developing an improved cognitive element to 
Navy procedures, which could be implemented as way of accounting for the 
effectiveness and risks inherent in the design of the Human-Automation interface, vice 




currently part of the IMPRINT model, it was simulated by assigning “Automation” as 
if it were a human; this could be programmed into a future version of IMPRINT to 
accomplish the same thing on a repeatable basis.  
d. The analysis showed the effect of fatigue on effectiveness during a representative watch 
period, with a mix of operating, corrective, planned maintenance, and emergency 
procedures executed over a finite time at varying fatigue levels.  This demonstrates that 
it is possible to apply the Navy Allowance Factor template in IMPRINT to determine 
the increase risk from fatigue resulting from manpower decisions that affect the number 
of personnel available to stand watch, as well as the effects of a circadian vice 
noncircadian rotation, if FAST (Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool) and other fatigue 
refinements were made to the IMPRINT program to allow a more detailed modeling of 
human fatigue.  
e. The analysis showed that IMPRINT Operations Model is capable of modeling the 
workload of individual operators and conducting a fairly robust failure mode analysis 
of critical procedures.  With some refinement, this process could be used to model and 
analyze current operational and maintenance procedures, proposed procedures, and 
provide risk analysis for manpower decisions for LCS and future ship classes.    
 
6.2 WIDENING THE SCOPE   
This analysis was limited to the Engineering watch team as a proof of concept, although 
one member of the team actually stands watch on the bridge.  The next logical step would be to 
model all 3 or 4 entire watch teams on the Bridge and Engineering, since this is where the primary 




allow more robust analysis of team workload, work sharing, and interactive dynamics of unplanned 
operations (such as Flight Operations or emergencies).  This would be the next logical progression 
now that the building blocks and process map has been established for turning standard Navy 
maintenance and operations procedures into IMPRINT missions, functions, and tasks in this 
project.  
  
6.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
           The following suggestions would allow researchers to expand on the work described in this 
analysis: 
a. Building a larger model. If further study proves these contributions to be valid, one 
recommendation would be to build an Operations Model of the three main watch areas 
of the LCS (or future ship design) that could in place and readily available as a baseline 
to feed more informed risk analysis into the way the Navy models shipboard manpower.  
This could result in better manning decisions that lead to increased crew safety and 
decreased mission impacting mechanical failures when operating these ships at sea.  
b. Conduct an actual at-sea validation by observing real individuals performing operating 
and maintenance procedures to capture times, record the frequency of errors, and 
measure other factors such as fatigue and workload to validate the model results. These 
could then be entered into the notional model to give a more realistic set of parameters 
and facilitate better analysis of the possible outcomes when running the model.  
c. Build an “Automation” function for IMPRINT that could capture the steps of 
procedures that are assumed to be perfectly executed by the system and look for areas 




procedures. This would create a more realistic expectation on the part of operators and 
could reduce errors associated with the automation-human interface. 
d. Consider the use of the results of this modeling process as a basis to make 
recommendations to the manning program during the acquisition process to include the 
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APPENDIX A  
  




Source: LCS Underway Watch (Condition III) Rotation - Red circle shows Engineer Team. (A 
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP MANPOWER ANALYSIS USING THE FLEET RESPONSE 
TRAINING PLAN, Mckinnya J. Williams-Robinson, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007, 














FAILURE MODE PARETO ANALYSIS  
  
A typical LCS ship has approximately 1200 total entries at any given time, and they can be sorted 
by system to find the systems with the highest number of failures.  For this analysis, a 6-year data 
set was analyzed consisting of 20,245 entries, of which some 10% were “placeholders” for 
scheduling of inspections, etc.  The remaining discrepancies were sorted by Hierarchal Sequence 
Number (HSC) which separates them into categories by type of equipment (i.e., Diesel Engine, 
Navigation, etc.).  This was then graphed as a Pareto chart, as shown below:  
  
 
Pareto Chart of LCS Failure Data (6-yr summary)  
  
In order to determine the best subset to focus the analysis, the results of the first Pareto chart were 




discrepancies with the highest potential impact of failure to mission. The decision for rating a 
system 1 to 3 was based on operator experience and the known mission failures mentioned earlier 


































CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE TABLE  
  
The following maintenance failures were selected based on the fact that they were listed as 
Priority 1, 2, or 3 maintenance items and that they were associated with equipment that was in 
the higher end of the Pareto analysis shown in Appendix B.  They were then analyzed using the 


















014911  1  23311  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
MPDE  
FILTER  
WARN           
DURING OPEN END  
INSPECTION IT WAS  
DISCOVERED THAT  
THE FILTER  
ASSEMBLY SHOWS  
SIGNS OF WARE AND 
METAL SHAVINGS.    1  4  2  8  
20126EA 







DRIVEN    
NR 2  SSDG 
OOC    
NR 2 SSDG OOC DUE  
TO A FAILED FUEL 
RECOVERY BLOCK  
AND ASSOCIATED  
CONNECTION FITTING. 
IMPACT: NR 2 SSDG 
DEGRADED.   2  4  3  24  
20126EA 
014631  2  23311  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 1  
MPDE JW 
PUMP  
OOC           
NR 1 MPDE JW PUMP 
TRIPPED THE CIRCUIT 
BREAKER.  
S/F INSPECTION  
IDENTIFIED PUMP  
MOTOR OOC DUE TO  
INTERNAL CORROSION 
AND  
DAMAGED WIRING.   2  4  2  16  
20126EA 







DRIVEN    
NR 2  SSDG 
OOC    
NR 2 SSDG VOLTAGE  
REGULATOR  
BREAKER TRIPPED  
WHILE SHIFTING 
FROM SHIP POWER TO 
SHORE POWER..  
IMPACT: NR 2 SSDG 











NR 2  
SSDG  
FUEL OIL  
LEAK         
S/F IDENTIFIED A  
LEAK ON THE  
ATTACHED FUEL OIL  
PUMP. MECHANICAL  
SEAL AND RETAINING  2  4  1  8  
 
   ENGINE 
DRIVEN    
  RING REQUIRE 
REPLACEMENT.  
IMPACT: REPAIR  
REQUIRED BEFORE  
OPERATING NR 2  
SSDG.     
    
20126EA 







DRIVEN    
NR 3  
SSDG  
THERMOC 
OUPLES         
S/F IDENTIFIED THAT  
THERMOCOUPLES ON 
NR 3 SSDG ARE 
DEGRADED. IMPACT:  
MPCMS EXHAUST  
TEMPERATURES FOR  
NR 3 SSDG ARE  
INACCURATE AND  
DO NOT ALLOW FOR 
PROPER  
MONITORING OF NR  
3 SSDG.        2  2  4  16  
20126EA 
013939  3  23311  
ENGINE 





ORDER    
S/F IDENTIFIED  
MOATTI FUEL FILTER  
DIFFERENTIAL  
PRESSURE  
TRANSMITTER ON NR  
2 MPDE IS FAILING  
AND WILL  
EVENTUALLY REQUIRE  
REPLACEMENT.  
IMPACT: EVENTUAL  
FAILURE WILL  
RESULT IN INABILITY  
TO MONITOR FUEL  
OIL FILTER  
DIFFERENTIAL  
PRESSURE. LIMITED  
OPERATIONAL 





013992  3  23311  
ENGINE 






S/F REQUIRES ON- 
HAND SPARES OF  
MPDE CONTROL AIR 
FILTER ELEMENTS.  
ELEMENTS WERE  
INSTALLED DURING  
FEBRUARY 2013  
AVAILABILITY AND  
HAVE NOT BEEN  
UPDATED AS PART  
OF ON-HAND STOCK,  
COSAL OR PMS  
DATABASES.  DUE TO  
LACK OF CURRENT 
STOCK.    3  2  3  18  
 
20126EA 
014222  3  23311  
ENGINE 





OOC      
S/F DISCOVERED  
STBD MPDE MOATTI 
FUEL FILTER WAS NOT 
SPINNING.  
UPON FURTHER  
INVESTIGATION, S/F  
FOUND THAT THE  
HYDRAULIC MOTOR  
HAD FAILED AND THE  
SELF-CLEANING  
FUNCTION OF THE  
FUEL FILTER WAS  
COMPLETELY  
DEGRADED. S/F  
REQUIRES  
REPLACEMENT  
HYDRAULIC MOTOR  
TO RESTORE STBD  
MPDE MOATTI FUEL 
FILTER TO FULL 
OPERABILITY..  3  2  2  12  
20126EA 
014789  3  23311  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 1  
MPDE SW  
PUMP  
GAUGE  
LINE    
NR 1 MPDE  
ATTACHED SW PUMP  
GAUGE LINE FAILED  
DUE TO SHEARED  
FITTING.   1  2  1  2  
20126EA 
015264  3  23311  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
MISSING  
GASKETS       
MPDES REQUIRE  
REPLACEMENT OF 





015571  3  23311  
ENGINE 




CARD         
 CIRCUIT CARD FOR  
JACKET WATER HIGH 
TEMP ALARM AND  
SHUTDOWN IS OOC.     3  2  3  18  
20126EA 
015590  3  23311  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
MECH  
SEAL  
FAILED NR  
1 MPDE      
MECHANICAL SEAL  
FAILED ON NR 1  
MPDE JACKET WATER 
KEEP WARM PUMP.   
2  3  1  6  
20126EA 
014271  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
PORT  
MPDE  
OOC              
FUEL OIL LEAK ON  
NR2 MPDE A  
CHIPPED COUPLING  
INJECTOR WAS  
DETERMINED TO BE  
THE ROOT CAUSE OF  
THE LEAK AND MUST  
BE REPLACED  
BEFORE OPERATING  
NR2 MPDE. 1 OF 2  
MPDE'S OOC.    2  4  1  8  
 
20126EA 
015131  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 2  
MPDE  
FUEL LEAK    
NR 2 MPDE OOC DUE  
TO A FUEL LEAK ON  
THE FUEL PIPE  
LEADING  
ASSOCIATED WITH 




NR 2 MPDE.     1  4  2  8  
20126EA 
015138  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 2  
MPDE   
PNEUMAT 
IC VALVE      
NR 2 MPDE P2-P5  
VALVE RECEIVING  
FALSE SIGNAL TO  
OPEN DUE TO A  
FAILED PNEUMATIC 
VALVE. IMPACT:  
POTENTIAL FOR  
DECREASED OUTPUT  
PRESSURE ON THE  
TURBOCHARGER DUE 
TO OPEN VALVE.     2  2  3  12  
20126EA 
015169  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 2  
MPDE SW  
FLAPPER  
VALVE      
VALVE ASSEMBLY PIN  
HOUSING WAS  
DEFORMED CAUSING 
PIN TO BEND AND 
VALVE TO SEIZE.  
VALVE ASSEMBLY  
AND ASSOCIATED  
COMPONENTS  
REQUIRE  





015496  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
NR 2  
MPDE   
AIR  
MOTOR  
SEIZED     
NR 1 MPDE AIR  
MOTOR BARRING  
DEVICE IS SEIZED.   2  2  2  8  
20126EA 
015589  3  23312  
ENGINE 
, DIESEL    
MECH  
SEAL  
FAILED NR  
2 MPDE      
MECHANICAL SEAL  
ON NR 2 MPDE IS  
GIVING INDICATION  
OF IMPENDING 
FAILURE.   2  3  2  12  
 
20126EA 










DRIVE       
NR 1 GTE  
V-BAND  
CLAMP          
NR 1 GTE V-BAND  
CLAMP BROKEN. 1  
OF 2 V-BAND  
CLAMPS SECURING  
THE ANTI-ICING  
SUPPLY HOSE TO THE  
ANTI-ICING CONTROL  
VALVE FAILED. GTE  
BLEED AIR SYSTEM  
SUPPLIES THE 
ANTIICING SUPPLY 
HOSE VIA THE ANTI-
ICING  
CONTROL VALVE. S/F  
UNABLE TO  






ALIGNMENT OF THE  
ANTI-ICING SYSTEM  
POSSIBLE WITHOUT  
THE ABILITY TO  
ISOLATE THE ANTI- 
ICING CONTROL  
VALVE. ALIGNMENT  
OF THE ANTI-ICING  
SYSTEM COULD  
CAUSE THE  
SECONDARY V-BAND  
CLAMP TO FAIL ON 
THE ANTI-ICING 
SUPPLY HOSE.  
IMPACT: NR 1 GTE  
OOC UNTIL  
REPLACEMENT V- 
BAND CLAMP IS  
RECEIVED AND 















MENTS         
DUE TO WATER  
INTRUSION IN THE  
PORT COMBINING  
AND STBD SPLITTER  
GEAR DUPLEX  
FILTERS, S/F MUST  
REPLACE FILTER  
ELEMENTS IN BOTH 
UNITS. IMPACT:  
FILTER  
REPLACEMENT  
REQUIRED TO  
RETURN REDUCTION  
GEARS TO 
OPERATIONAL 
CONDITION.   1  1  2  2  
 
20126EA 






TION         
GARLOCK  
3000              
SHIPS FORCE  
REQUIRES GARLOCK  
BLUE GUARD 3000  
1/8IN THICKNESS TO 
COMPLETE REPAIRS  
TO SPLITTER GEAR.    1  1  1  1  
20126EA 






TION         
GARLOCK  
3000              
SHIPS FORCE  
REQUIRES GARLOCK  
BLUE GUARD 3000  
1/4 IN THICKNESS TO 
COMPLETE REPAIRS  
TO SPLITTER GEAR.    1  1  1  1  
20126EA 






TION         
VALVES  
LEAKING       
SPLITTER GEAR  
VALVES RLO-V-105C  
AND 106C  LOCATED  
ON UNDERSIDE OF  
GEAR LEAK WHILE  
OIL IS CIRCULATING  
AND REQUIRE  
REPLACEMENT.   2  2  2  8  
20126EA 






JET            
NR 3 LUBE  
OIL PP  
GAUGE  
OOC      
S/F IDENTIFIED  
DIFFERENTIAL  
PRESSURE GAGE FOR  
NR 3 LUBE OIL  
POWER PACK FILTER  
ELEMENT IS OOC AND 
REQUIRES 
REPLACEMENT.   
IMPACT: INABILITY  
TO MONITOR LUBE  
OIL FILTER  
DIFFERENTIAL  
PRESSURE TO  
DETERMINE FILTER  




REQUIREMENT.    
20126EA 










WATERJET    
WHILE CONDUCTING  
STEERING CHECKS IN  
PREPARATION FOR  




DEGREES TO STBD.  
WHEN ATTEMPTING  
TO CYCLE PORT  
STEERABLE  
WATERJET BACK TO 
CENTERLINE, THE  
INDICATOR WOULD  
NOT MOVE. UPON  
FURTHER  
INSPECTION S/F  
DISCOVERED THAT  
THE FEED BACK  
CABLE WAS BROKEN  
AND THEREFORE  
NOT ABLE TO SEND  2  2  3  12  
     AN INDICATION OF  
WATERJET  
MOVEMENT TO THE 
INDICATOR.   












LSION       
NR 2  
NAVLAN  
UPS OOC      
PMS IDENTIFIED NR 2 




IMPACT: LOSS OF 1  
OF 2 NAVLAN  
SERVERS AND LOSS  
OF REDUNDANCY TO  
MPCMS UPON LOSS  
OF SHIPS POWER.     2  2  4  16  
20126EE 







LSION       
MPCMS  
UPS NR 1  
DEGRADE 
D         
MPCMS UPS NR 1  
DISPLAYING A CHECK 
INVERTER FAULT.  
CONTINUED T/S IAW  




IMPACT: MPCMS UPS  
NR 1 DEGRADED  
UNTIL BATTERIES ARE 
REPLACED.  
FOLLOWING A LOSS  
OF POWER, MPCMS  
UPS NR 1 IS  
DESIGNED TO  
POWER I/O LOOPS  
1P, 2P, 5P, AND 5A.     2  2  4  16  
20126EE 







LSION       
MPCMS  
UPS NR 2  
DEGRADE 
D         
MPCMS UPS NR 2  
BATTERIES SHOW  
SIGNS OF  
DEPLETION. IMPACT:  




FOLLOWING A LOSS  
OF POWER, MPCMS  
UPS NR 2 IS  
DESIGNED TO  
POWER I/O LOOPS  












APPENDIX D  
  
PLANNED MAINTENANCE TABLE  
  
The following subset of Planned Maintenance Procedures were selected based on the incidence 
of failure determined by the Pareto analysis of corrective maintenance, and then analyzed using 




Diesel Engine Governor 
Lube  1  2  1  2  
   4-M6  Inspect LO Pump  1  2  1  2  
   9M-1  Engine Test  1  4  4  16  
   M-1R  LO Sample  3  2  1  6  
   M-6  Inspect Air Filter  3  2  1  6  
   R-3D  LO Viscosity Test  4  3  3  36  
   W-1R  Inspect Loop Seal  4  2  1  8  
2341  8M-1  Power Turbine LO Sample  1  2  1  2  
   A-9  Inspect LO Cooler  1  3  2  6  
2342  A-1  GT Oil Sample  1  3  1  3  
   W=2R  Test GT LO Flash Point  4  3  2  24  
2418  M-1R  Clean Air Filter  3  2  1  6  
   M-2  Replace Air Filter  3  3  1  9  
   R-34M  Test Air Flow  3  3  3  27  
   
R-33D  
Reduction Gear Pilot Light  
4  3  3  36  
2531  R-4D  Stern Seal Leakage  4  3  2  24  
   R2-W  Flash Point Test  3  3  3  27  
2471  R-10W  Drain Water from Filter  4  3  2  24  
256     Seawater Cooling  4  1  1  4  
  
Table D-1. PMS Procedure Risk Matrix  
 From the PMS procedures determined to be high risk, the ones chosen for modeling are 
indicated in BOLD in the table above. To allow for a broad spectrum of risk, one was selected 




                                                               APPENDIX E 
 
OPERATING PROCEDURES TABLE 
  
From the Engineering Operating Procedures, a selection was made based on the corrective 
maintenance Pareto analysis and these were analyzed using the risk matrix.  The resulting 
procedures are shown below:  
  
EOSS 





CAEPA  Electric Plant  
Alignment 
Procedures  2  3  4  24  
FSST  
Service and Storage 
Tanks  
Stripping water and 
contaminants  4  2  3  24  
FOMT  
Fuel Oil Transfer  
Pump  
– Align for Remote  
Operations  3  2  4  24  
FOAS  
Fuel Oil Service  
System  
Align for Operation  
2  3  2  12  
CPTM  Gas Turbine Brake  
Operation, motoring  







2  4  1  8  
CLOP  Lube Oil Pumps  Starting/Stopping  
4  3  3  36  
CFOP  Fuel Oil Pumps  Starting/Stopping  4  3  2  24  
BGTM  B Fire GTM  B Fire  1  3  1  3  
CASF  Electric Plant  Bus Tie Parallel  4  1  4  16  
CASSD 
G  
Cool Air  Failure  





1  4  3  12  
CSFG  Diesel   Fire  1  4  4  16  
CED  Eductor  
Operation, motoring  
3  1  1  3  




CFOSS  Boats  Fuel  2  2  2  8  
CFP  Fire Pump  
Operation, motoring  
4  3  1  12  
CFMP 
O  
EDG  Console Operation  
4  3  3  36  
CHAA  CHT  Alarm  1  1  2  2  
MLOL  Main Lube Oil  Pump Operation  3  1  4  12  
  
CPTM  Console  Operation  1  2  2  4  
CPWS  Potable Water  
Operation, motoring  
2  2  1  4  
CFSRT  Fuel System  Refuel Helo  4  3  3  36  
EPOP  Electric Plant  
Operation, motoring  
4  4  1  16  
EPT  Power Turbine  Vibration  2  2  3  12  
FOAS  Fuel Oil System  Align  4  2  3  24  
GTES  Gas Turbine  Start  3  3  3  27  
HBDG  Hot Bearing  Casualty Response  3  1  3  9  
FPM  Fire Pump  
Operation, motoring  





APPENDIX F  
  
IMPRINT PROTOCOLS  
  
The following notes pertain to the IMPRINT program that was used for this analysis.    
Version: 4.6.54 dated December 2018  
IMPRINT is a modeling program based on C# programming language; knowledge of C# is no 
required to use the program, but some programming is necessary for more complex scenarios.    
IMPRINT has three basic types of models:  
• Warfighter – Designed to model large crews at a macro level  
• Operations – Designed to model an operational mission (used for this analysis)  
• Maintainer – Designed to determine maintenance requirements  
For this analysis we used the Operations Model to model the Watch and Work portion of the 
Naval Allowance Factor (formerly Standard Navy Work Week).  Each segment of the NAF was 
built as a separate “Mission” for analysis.  Individual procedures (Planned Maintenance, 
Corrective Maintenance, Operations) were designated as “Functions” and the steps of these 
procedures “Tasks”.  
Once a workflow analysis was performed on the task, using operator experience or known 
information (for example, the duration of a Planned Maintenance Check is provided on each 
procedure), the functions were entered in a notional sequence that simulated the normal flow of a 














Figure A-1. Time and Accuracy Data Entry Fields  
  
Tasks were then entered in sequence, with the following basic protocols:  
The Time Criteria. A value was entered based on the workflow analysis as the expected time 
required for that particular step. Where possible, this was based on the baseline for similar tasks 
which is built into IMPRINT, where a variety of tasks are listed along with “standard” times and 
the research reference that supports it.  In cases where this was not available, reasonable estimates 
were made based on operator experience.  These could be refined in future studies, to include 




 Success Criteria.  This is for accounting purposes and does not determine success or failure for 
the mission, however it may yield useful data for future analysis of individual tasks.  As a 
default, the analyst entered 85% for all tasks.   
IMPRINT offers three options for entering the expected task time:  
• Enter Task Time: A fixed time chosen by the operator (Generally not used)  
• Use Expression: A user-entered expression (Generally not used)  
• Distribution:  A pulldown menu with several options (Used for most tasks)  o For most 
tasks, a normal distribution was chosen, although others are available.  This allows for a 
more realistic simulation for multiple runs to account for performance of procedural tasks 
by different personnel under variable conditions.  
• Mean: A reasonable estimate for the time expected for the operation – may or may not 
match the time criteria entry  
• Standard Deviation: This was generally entered as 20% of the Mean, with a subjective 
assessment of tasks with a wide range of variability entered as 30% and tasks with little 
expected variation 10%  
The next tab is titled “Calculate Task Success” and is used to enter data that could determine the 
human error that may be encountered during performance of the task.  Here again 85% was entered 
as the default value for all tasks.    
The same rules were applied (Normal Distribution, Mean and Standard Deviation) as in the “Time” 
section.    
This section also has 3 possible criteria to assess accuracy:  
• Percent Correct (not used)  




• Number of Errors (Used in this analysis)  
Based on the entries here, a “Probability of Success” is calculated and displayed.  
The “Effects” tab is used to add conditions (Release Condition, Beginning Effect, Ending Effect) 
that control the transition to the next task.  For the majority of tasks in this analysis, no additional 
entries were made here, but it is available for detailed tailoring, such as when two tasks have to 
complete before another one starts.  In these cases, basic C# programming language and protocol 
was used.  
The “Failure” tab allows entry of expected failure probability, and the results of this failure 
(Mission failure, delay, inaccuracy, task repeat or reassignment), represented by percentages that 
must total 100%.  For most tasks, the “No Effect” was chosen, unless the task was a critical one, 
and a percent failure was entered as appropriate, based on the Failure Analysis for that task 
(specifically that step in the given procedure).  
The “Crew” tab allows the selection of the applicable crew member (in this analysis RCO, EPT 
and System).  Automated tasks were color coded to show those that are performed by automation 
vice an operator.  
 The “Taxon” Tab allows operator-entered values for the following: Perceptual, Cognitive, 
Motor, Communication and allows the opportunity to map these to the workload values added in 
the following tab.  
 The “Paths” Tab allows the operator to use single or multiple paths between tasks, including 
options for multiple outcomes based on a percentage basis.    
The “Workload” Tab allows the operator to assign values to each of the taxons based on empirical 
studies – these are also compared in a matrix to indicate the extent that each one interferes with 




pre-selected values from a pull-down menu.  For this analysis the values were selected based on 
the “swim lane” factors determined during the work flow analysis of each procedure. While not 
exact correlations, the determination was generally straightforward.  
 The “Performance Shaping” tab has options for noise, heat, cold, vibration, sleep, and MOPP 
level.  These could be used to more closely model individual situations, with the sleep option 
being the most closely aligned to the dimensions examined in this analysis.  These factors can be 
toggled on and off for comparison between successive executions of the mission.  For this 
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